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Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the 
story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad’s body by a kiss from 
a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for 
the profitability of the target company. We’ve observed many kisses but very few miracles. 
Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency 
of their kisses even after their corporate backyards are knee deep in unresponsive toads. 
Warren Buffet, Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report 1981 
1 Introduction 
At the beginning of fiscal year 1993/94, Preussag’s sales were 4% in logistics, 4% in 
information technology, and 92% in “old economy” lines of business, including metal 
trading, steel, mining, shipbuilding, and plant construction. At the end of 2004, tourism 
accounted for 73%, logistics for 19%, and nine of the ten “old economy” segments as well 
as information technology were gone. Moreover, the company had now relabeled itself 
“TUI AG,” and only the identities of its CEO, its chairman of the supervisory board, its 
largest shareholder, and the registration code of its stock preserved continuity. From 1994 
to 2004 the stock gained 9% while the market index rose by 71% and an industry-weighted 
portfolio by 115%. We track Preussag’s history and the fate of its stock and analyze its 47 
acquisitions and 46 divestitures as well as other transactions and news events. We find that 
Preussag’s divestiture program was a success and added significant shareholder value. 
However, the investment of divestiture proceeds into tourism was misguided: Preussag lost 
value by investing in an industry it did not understand and, ultimately, by overpaying for 
assets to which it could not add any value. Or, extending Warren Buffet’s famous parable, 
as Preussag kissed too many toads that failed to turn into princes, it ultimately became a 
rather unattractive toad itself. 
This paper asks what went wrong in the process that turned Preussag, a traditional 
diversified conglomerate, into TUI, a modern and focused services company. In the 
process, we suggest some general conclusions about corporate governance, acquisition 
programs, incentives for voluntary liquidations, and the potentially ill-fated role of 
institutional shareholders. 
We analyze three phases of Preussag’s development: 
Phase 1: From January 1, 1994 to June 10, 1997 Preussag’s strategy was to restructure its 
core lines of business, expand the profitable segments and divest everything that 
was not profitable. This strategy looked promising initially but then delivered 
less than expected, and the stock lost 25.0% relative to the market index. 
Phase 2: On June 11, 1997 Preussag bought Hapag-Lloyd, a company in container 
shipment, luxury cruises, airlines, and travel agencies. From then on until 
September 11, 2001, Preussag undertook altogether 16 acquisitions in tourism 
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and divested most of its former lines of business. During this period, Preussag 
outperformed the market index by 29.6%. 
Phase 3: Beginning with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, tourism went 
through a number of crises that marked a structural shift in the industry. Preussag 
slowed down its acquisitions and consolidated its tourism and logistics 
operations. Most restructuring was internal during this period, and the stock 
underperformed the market by 38.4% until December 31, 2004. 
Our main focus is on the second phase where Preussag entered tourism, as it presents the 
key to understanding the turnaround in the company’s strategy. We group transactions into 
several categories, including “tourism acquisitions,” “other acquisitions,” and “sell-offs.” 
We also analyze “tourism news” and “other news,” mostly financial disclosures. We then 
conduct an analysis of variance of Preussag’s stock return in order to distinguish the impact 
of different categories of news and announcements on the stock price. We also adapt event 
study methodology to our problem. Our main findings are: 
• The positive performance in Phase 2 is explained entirely by Preussag’s divestiture 
program. Divestitures themselves explain an outperformance relative to the stock 
market of 48%.1 
• The positive impact of divestitures hides the value destruction through tourism 
acquisitions. These reduced the stock price by 35% relative to the index. 
• The crises affecting tourism in Phase 3 cannot explain the underperformance of 
Preussag during this time. 
We then calculate the value Preussag would have had if it had divested all its traditional 
businesses but not acquired any tourism companies. Had Preussag invested the proceeds 
from its sell-offs into a tourism and logistics index, rather than into tourism and logistics 
companies, then its shareholders would have almost tripled their wealth to more than €11 
billion rather than seeing it reduced to €3.3 billion. 
Preussag followed a strategy of “business migration” that only few other firms have 
followed before.2 The remarkable feature of Preussag remains the speed of their 
transformation, which mostly happened, between 1997 and 2001. Our analysis shows that 
                                                          
1  This and the following number measure performance relative to an index in logarithmic returns and refer 
to the calculations in Section 4. 
2  Besanko, Dranove and Shanley (2000) cite the example of American Can, a maker of tin cans and metal 
containers, that became Primerica, a financial services company that acquired the US business of Barclays 
Bank and Smith Barney. Others include US Steel that became USX when it added oil to its steel business 
(without divesting steel), and International Harvester, a farm equipment manufacturer in the 1930s and 
1940s, that became the truck manufacturer Navistar today (see Besanko, Dranove and Shanley, 2000, pp. 
200-201). 
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this strategy consistently destroyed large amounts of shareholder value and raises the 
question why such a strategy could be followed over an extended period of time without 
any interference by shareholders. We study Preussag’s corporate governance and find that 
compensation was practically unrelated to performance and did not provide incentives for a 
voluntary liquidation of the company. Rather, compensation increased substantially as 
Preussag was transformed into Europe’s largest tourism company. We also document that 
this strategy created significant private benefits in the form of increased status for 
Preussag’s CEO as he accumulated seats on other companies’ boards. At the first glance, a 
better alignment of management’s and shareholder’s interests could have been expected as 
Preussag had an independent supervisory board and a large controlling shareholder. 
However, it turns out, however, that the large shareholder was an intermediary – a state-
owned bank – whose management had little incentive to prevent the destruction of 
shareholder value. This bank commanded almost complete control over Preussag through 
its voting power and interlocking directorates. 
Our discussion of corporate governance and the causes of value destruction brings out four 
general points: (1) Managerial discretion is not limited to free operating cash flows, but also 
includes the (potentially much larger) proceeds from divestitures; (2) Large shareholders 
are a mixed blessing if they are institutions that suffer from agency problems themselves; 
(3) Compensation is critical to induce value-enhancing, voluntary liquidations; (4) 
Independent supervisory boards lose their bite in networks of cross-holdings and board 
interlocks. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the details of the history of Preussag 
and background information on the major players. Section 3 introduces our data and the 
method of analysis. Section 4 contains the main results of our empirical analysis. Section 5 
is devoted to an analysis of what went wrong at Preussag and puts the case into a larger 
context. Section 6 summarizes the reaction of Preussag’s management to our results, and 
Section 7 concludes. 
2 Background and Stock Price History 
History of Preussag 
Preussag’s history dates back to 1924, when the “Preussische Bergwerks- und Hütten-
Aktiengesellschaft” took over state-owned amber operations in Königsberg, turning 
Prussian civil servants into entrepreneurs.3 The first step towards privatization was taken 
with the 1959 IPO and the name changed to Preussag AG in 1964. Acquisitions in the 
1960s created a diversified conglomerate with engagements in logistics, mining, oil 
 4
exploration, metal production, and trading. In 1989 Preussag took over Salzgitter AG, a 
state-owned company in steel, shipbuilding, and engineering, creating a corporation with 
more than 70.000 employees. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 provides data on Preussag’s sales by segment and shows that in fiscal year 1992/93, 
their largest segment by revenues was trading (trading in steel and non-ferrous metals), 
which together with the related logistics operations accounted for 40% of sales.4 Plant 
construction with altogether 13 different activities (including nuclear power plants, civil 
engineering, underground engineering) prospered at this time because of the construction 
boom after German unification. Steel production was the third largest segment with 10.4% 
of sales. The Herfindahl index that measures the degree of diversification is 0.18 for this 
fiscal year, describing a moderately diversified conglomerate. 
Preussag’s main shareholder: WestLB 
The major shareholder of Preussag during the entire period under consideration here is the 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (WestLB), who owned 29.1% directly and another 
approximately 3.5% indirectly through their 33.3% stake in Niedersachsen Holding. 
WestLB was important for Preussag not only as its major shareholder but also through its 
portfolio of industrial holdings, especially in tourism. This becomes apparent from Figure 
1A, which describes the major blockholdings in the Preussag-WestLB-network in 1994 that 
remained almost unchanged until June 1997. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
WestLB is the fourth largest German bank by assets and also the largest state-owned bank 
in the country with its main regional focus in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia.5 The 
original purpose of WestLB was to assist small local savings banks to coordinate their 
liquidity. These savings banks are community owned and were founded to provide 
affordable banking services to small and medium size businesses and less well-off 
households. In addition, WestLB is a major lender to the state and to the communities of 
North Rhine-Westphalia. The owners of WestLB, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia and 
a number of communities, guarantee for all liabilities of the bank. In the 1960s, WestLB 
began to extend its scope and started to assemble a portfolio of stakes in German 
companies. Over subsequent decades, these included Preussag, Babcock and a number of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
3  The name can be translated as “Prussian Mining and Steel, Inc.”; Königsberg is now Kaliningrad, Russia. 
4  We do not have earnings figures by segment. German GAAP requires segment reporting for sales only. 
5  Handelsblatt, December 3, 2001, p. 21. We rely on Handelsblatt for most of our company information. It 
is a German business daily newspaper with detailed company reports. 
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major tourism companies (see Figure 1A). In the 1980s and 1990s, WestLB expanded into 
investment banking and leasing and built up a worldwide network of branches. WestLB 
made headlines in 2003 when its London branch lost about €500 million in a deal with the 
UK based TV rental company Boxclever. 
Phase 1: Consolidate core businesses (1994-1997) 
On January 1, 1994 Michael Frenzel, already a member of the management board for six 
years, became CEO of Preussag. During the first three years of his leadership, Preussag 
followed a strategy described as “value-oriented development.” Its key focus was to 
“extend Preussag’s core competencies in plant engineering and construction and 
technological services.” (Preussag, Annual Report 1993/94, p. 9). This strategy comprised 
the following parts: (1) Identify three segments for growth, (2) retain “core segments” with 
more limited growth prospects but sufficient profitability, (3) divest segments that have no 
potential for growth and are not profitable, and (4) accelerate internationalization by 
expansion into the Asian-Pacific region as margins in Western Europe stagnate. Following 
this strategy, Preussag sold the Hagenuk group, a manufacturer of mobile phones that 
suffered severe losses, and exited from railcar manufacturing. Apart from these segments, 
the relative weights of the other segments within the company did not change much until 
fiscal year 1996/97. Preussag undertook 11 acquisitions and 14 sell-offs from January 1994 
to June 1997. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2A displays Preussag’s stock price for this period. The figure shows the 
performance indices of Preussag’s stock and of the CDAX, so dividends are always 
reinvested. The CDAX represents a value-weighted portfolio of all German corporations 
traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange. During most of the first phase, where Preussag’s 
management tried to restructure their old economy businesses, the stock price tracked the 
development of the index closely, with some divergence becoming apparent in the second 
half of 1996. As of 1997, the German stock market index started a strong ascent, in line 
with other markets worldwide, which Preussag’s stock followed only partially. Over the 
first phase until June 10, 1997, Preussag’s stock increased by 27.6%, which is 25% less 
than the CDAX performance over the same time period. Our analysis needs to address the 
question why Preussag underperformed the index in this phase. 
Phase 2: Enter tourism (1997-2001) 
On June 11, 1997 Preussag bid for Hapag-Lloyd AG and opened a new chapter in the 
company’s history. Hapag-Lloyd celebrated its 150th anniversary in the same year, which 
they dated to the foundation of the “Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-
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Gesellschaft” (short “Hapag”) in 1847, which had opened its North Atlantic service 
(Hamburg-America-Line) in 1848. Its main focus is in global container shipping, airlines, 
travel agencies, and luxury cruises, four areas entirely unrelated to Preussag’s traditional 
lines of business. Hapag-Lloyd was publicly listed but its free float was less than 1% of its 
shares. Hapag-Lloyd also owned a 30% stake in TUI, which was a tour operator 
independent of Preussag (see Figure 1A). 
With this takeover, Preussag entered the German tourism market that consisted of three 
main segments: tour operators, travel agencies and charter airlines. An integrated European 
tourism industry did not exist at that time. The tour operator market had a volume of about 
€15.6 billion in 1997 and had grown at an annual rate of almost 9% since 1990. This market 
was highly concentrated at the time with the three major players being TUI (market share: 
26%), C&N (22%) and LTU (12%). The German travel agency market grew by an annual 
7.3% between 1990 and 1998 and reached a sales volume of about €22.5 billion in 1997. 
During the previous decade the concentration in this segment had increased dramatically 
but was still only moderate. As a consequence of the aggressively expanding travel agency 
chains and the entry of new competitors, average industry return on sales decreased 
significantly from 10.1% in 1993 to 3.3% in 1996. The three major players in this market 
are Hapag-Lloyd, First and C&N with a combined market share of about 20%. Finally, the 
charter flight market was also a fast growing segment during the 90’s because of the 
increasing popularity of overseas holidays. Like the tour operator segment, this market is an 
oligopoly where the three major airlines are Condor/C&N (24%), LTU (24%) and Hapag-
Lloyd (16%). Clearly, the features of tourism as a growing market and the perceived 
general shift of the economy from manufacturing towards services made it look attractive 
compared to the stagnating, cyclical, and often loss-making traditional businesses Preussag 
operated before. 
During this period, Preussag undertook 26 acquisitions (16 of which were in tourism) and 
15 divestitures, mostly of its traditional lines of business. As a result, Preussag became 
more focused, and its degree of diversification fell significantly over this period. The 
Herfindahl index based on sales reached 0.38 in 2001, almost double the average value 
during 1994-1997. At the same time, WestLB disengaged from tourism, selling most of it 
to Preussag. Figure 1B depicts the ownership and cross-shareholdings at the end of 1999. 
The comparison to Figure 1C shows how acquisitions and divestitures disentangled this 
network in subsequent years. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 2B shows that Preussag’s stock appreciated by 44.8% over this period (until 
September 10, 2001), whereas the market as a whole rose by only 15%. A potential 
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explanation for this superior performance is that Preussag is just a high-beta stock that 
profited from the general rise in markets. Figure 3A disproves this conjecture. The chart 
shows the development of Preussag’s beta from 1994 to 2004 measured over a moving 500 
trading day window. This beta is highest at the beginning and at the end of the period (close 
to 1.0), but low in the middle phase between 1997 and 2001, where it falls into the 0.6-0.8 
range. Hence, Preussag outperformed the market while moving its field of operations from 
“old economy” towards tourism. We therefore have to address the question why Preussag 
outperformed the market and whether this can be interpreted as an endorsement of its 
business model by the stock market. 
Phase 3: Consolidate tourism (2001-2004) 
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, tourism suffered a general setback. 
Subsequent events like the war in Iraq and the SARS epidemic in Asia reinforced these 
problems for many tourism companies. We therefore separate this third phase from the 
previous phase. After September 11, 2001, Preussag scaled back its acquisition program 
and undertook only 10 smaller acquisitions (9 in tourism) and continued to exit from its 
previous lines of business with a total of 17 divestitures. Their efforts were focused on 
consolidating and restructuring their tourism business. At the end of 2004, almost three-
fourths of their sales came from tourism and another 19% from logistics, raising the 
Herfindahl index for diversification to 0.58.6 
Figure 2C shows that Preussag’s stock price fell by 11% by the close of trading on 
September 11 in Frankfurt. While the CDAX fell in line with other stock markets, the 
decline for Preussag was sharper, underperforming the index by more than 20% within the 
first ten days of the attacks. However, the CDAX subsequently started a sustained recovery, 
finishing 2004 at 97% of its value on September 10, 2001, whereas Preussag ended 2004 at 
less than 60% of its value on that day. Preussag’s beta increased after 2000 to values around 
1.0, so this cannot explain why Preussag declined more than the market. Preussag’s low 
stock price nearly led to its exclusion from Germany’s major stock index, the DAX in 2004. 
It also led to takeover speculations when Morgan Stanley raised its stake in Preussag to 
10% in July 2004, and WestLB repeatedly expressed its interest to sell its 31.4% stake in 
Preussag. In December 2004, WestLB sold a 10% stake to a Spanish investor who is 
reportedly a close friend of Preussag’s CEO Michael Frenzel. The remaining WestLB 
shares were placed with other Spanish investors and with European institutional investors. 
In Section 4.3 we investigate what caused the spectacular collapse of Preussag’s stock price 
                                                          
6  Preussag changed its name to TUI, its former tourism subsidiary, on June 26, 2002, towards the end of the 
period under consideration here. Throughout the text, we still refer to the company as Preussag and ignore 
the change of name in order to avoid confusion. 
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over Phase 3. Was it just bad luck from an unforeseeable negative shock that was entirely 
outside management’s control as managers claimed?7 Or did the market – belatedly – 
recognize the problems of Preussag’s concept of an integrated tourism company? 
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
In order to collect a complete set of transaction announcements and news we searched for 
“Preussag,” “TUI,” and “Hapag-Lloyd” in five different databases. (1) The Genios 
Business database, which includes several major German newspapers and business 
periodicals;8 (2) DGAP, a service that collects disclosures to regulators;9 (3) The press 
release database of TUI AG available from their website; (4) For the years 2003 and 2004 
we also had access to Lexis-Nexis and searched this database for “TUI”.10 Whenever we 
identified a transaction in any of these databases, we verified the names of acquirer and 
target with the Genios Business database. We also downloaded all transactions from 
Thomson Financial SDC where these companies appear either as target or as acquirer, but 
we found this database to be particularly unreliable. 11 We therefore deleted all events from 
Thomson Financial that could not be confirmed from one of the other sources. These were 
only small and probably insignificant transactions, so we feel confident that this decision 
does not bias our results but that it significantly enhances the accuracy of our data. 
As a general rule we assume that disclosures to the market happened one trading day before 
the publication date of the newspaper. For electronic disclosures we use the same day. In 
those cases where there is clear evidence (time stamp) that the news did not reach the 
market before the close of trading, we assign the event day to the subsequent trading day. 
We cannot exclude the possibility that we miss the correct event date by one trading day in 
some instances. We also searched the Genios Business database for news articles and press 
releases on industry news relevant to Preussag’s businesses. In total, we can identify 125 
                                                          
7  Preussag, Annual Report 2003, p. 107. We refer to annual reports by fiscal year, not by publication date. 
For example, Preussag’s annual report for the fiscal year 1994/95 was published in 1996. 
8  These include the Wall Street Journal Europe, Handelsblatt, the M&A Review, Tagesspiegel, 
Wirtschaftswoche, VDI Nachrichten, Der Spiegel, and Die Zeit. 
9  DGAP is “Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc Publizität mbH“ and collects the disclosures to BAFIN 
(Bundeaufsichtsamt für das Wertpapierwesen), the German financial regulator (equivalent to the SEC in 
the US or the FSA in the UK). 
10  Lexis-Nexis includes the Financial Times, Financial Times Deutschland, Börsen-Zeitung, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Frankfurter Rundschau. 
11  In many cases, the announcement date was confused with the effective date. In several other cases the 
announcement date was the publication date of the newspaper article even though exact time and date 
stamps for disclosures or company press releases existed. In more than 35% of the cases we had to correct 
the announcement date because it was evidently incorrect. This database was also highly incomplete. 
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transaction announcements and 292 news items that we retain in our dataset, a total of 417 
events. 
We classify all announcements into the following five groups: tourism acquisitions, other 
acquisitions, sell-offs, tourism news, and other news. Whenever some ownership is 
transferred, we classify an announcement as an acquisition or a sell-off – irrespective of the 
percentage of ownership transferred in the transaction. Joint ventures to which Preussag 
mainly contributed cash and Preussag’s partners contributed assets are classified as 
acquisitions. On the other hand, we regard the announcements of strategic alliances and 
joint ventures where Preussag does not contribute cash as a news item. Announcements of 
internal restructurings are also considered news items. Note that some transactions generate 
multiple announcements if they are executed in stages or if different pieces of news reach 
the market on different days. In total, we identify 62 announcements of 46 sell-offs and 63 
announcements of 47 acquisitions, of which 25 were in tourism. Of the 292 news items, 44 
regard tourism. Most of the others are disclosures of financial statements of Preussag and 
its subsidiaries. 
We obtain stock market data from Thomson Financial Datastream. We choose the CDAX 
as the relevant market index. The CDAX represents a value-weighted portfolio of all 
German corporations traded on the Frankfurt stock exchange. All time series were adjusted 
for German holidays without stock market trading in order to avoid an underestimation of 
the excess returns’ variance. Stock returns were calculated from the return index, which 
includes reinvested dividends. 
3.2 Methodology and Methodological Problems 
In order to test our hypotheses and address our questions, we analyze Preussag’s stock price 
reaction in two different ways: (1) with a regression of Preussag’s returns on dummy 
variables, and (2) with an adaptation of standard event study methodology. For our 
analysis, we use log returns, because log returns are additive over time and facilitate the 
attribution of returns to classes of events. 
Choice of benchmarks 
For both methods, a benchmark for the normal or expected performance must be chosen 
first. For Preussag, this turns out to be a major methodological problem, because the 
correlation of Preussag’s shares with the market index varies markedly over time as Figure 
3A demonstrates. Even within each of the three subperiods we defined above, Preussag’s 
CAPM beta is not constant. On the other hand, 417 events in 11 years render it impossible 
to find enough ‘clean’ estimation windows for estimating the model separately for each 
event. We therefore work with the market adjusted model and simply deduct the market 
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return (CDAX) from Preussag’s return in order to arrive at Preussag’s abnormal return. 
Brown and Warner (1985) show in a simulation study that the size and power of tests based 
on the market-adjusted model are only marginally worse than tests based on the market 
model. 
We also employ an industry-adjusted model, where we subtract the return on an 
appropriately weighted industry index from Preussag’s returns when calculating Preussag’s 
abnormal returns. This industry-adjusted model helps us distinguishing between industry 
effects and firm-specific effects, because industry effects do not ‘wash out’ as in standard 
event studies based on firms from many industries. Since Preussag’s activities moved more 
and more from steel and engineering towards tourism and logistics, we construct two 
industry indices: The steel and engineering index is an equally weighted portfolio of the 
FTSE Europe steel and other metals index and the FTSE Europe engineering and 
machinery index. The tourism and logistics index is an equally weighted portfolio of the 
FTSE Europe leisure and hotels index and the FTSE Europe transport index. Figure 3B 
displays the coefficients of a regression of Preussag’s daily returns on the corresponding 
returns of these two indices and an intercept where the regression is performed over a 
moving 500 trading day window. Both series start in January 1995, because the FTSE 
Europe indices are not available before January 1994. The plot demonstrates that the 
correlation between Preussag’s returns and the returns on the tourism and logistics index 
steadily and markedly increases over the period considered while the correlation with the 
steel and engineering index decreases. The plot therefore reflects the transformation of 
Preussag from a steel and engineering conglomerate to an integrated tourism and logistics 
service provider. 
As Preussag gradually moves from one industry to another, we construct a weighted 
industry index for use in the industry-adjusted model. A similar approach has been used by 
Parrino (1997). We weight the ‘steel and engineering’-index and the ‘tourism and 
logistics’-index with the total assets of each segment according to the most recent balance 
sheet.12 The weight on ‘tourism and logistics’ rises steadily from 3.1% in 1994 to 97.6% in 
2004. 
Regression approach 
For each of the three time periods, we regress the daily abnormal returns ARt on an 
intercept and on up to six dummy variables Di,t that are set equal to one for every day t 
within the event window for an event of type i. So if type 1 represents sell-offs, the event 
                                                          
12  We could not obtain total assets for segments prior to September 30, 1998, so we use sales as a weight 
before that date. We use sales numbers excluding intra-company sales for computing these weights. These 
sales figures differ from those reported in Table 1 where intra-company sales are included. 
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window is [-1, 0], and a sell-off was announced on day τ, then D1,τ-1 = D1,τ = 1. The 
regression equation is: 
 
6
,
1
ˆ ˆαˆ β ε
=
= + +∑t i i t t
i
AR D  (1) 
Here αˆ  and the βˆ ’s are estimates of the regression coefficients and tεˆ  the OLS residuals. 
This regression approach has been widely used in the literature. (See Binder, 1985, for a 
comparison with the standard event study method.) In the context of a clinical study, the 
regression approach has been used by Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2000). By summing 
equation (1) over all observations t, we obtain: 
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where n is the number of observations used in the regression and ni is the number of 
observations for which the dummy variable Di equals one, i.e. ,=∑i i tn D . Note that the 
sum of the residuals εˆ t  is zero as these are OLS residuals. In Tables 2, 4, and 6, we report 
the cumulative effects βˆi in  rather than the average effects βˆi , because we want to quantify 
the total impact of the different components of Preussag’s strategy. 
Event study approach 
Our second approach is based on standard event study methodology. We calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for a small event window around each event 
individually and then add the CARs of events of the same type (sell-offs, tourism 
acquisitions, etc.) in order to test more general hypotheses. We use the same classes as in 
the regression analysis. 
As we consider 417 announcements during a total of 2,775 trading days, we naturally 
encounter overlapping event windows and even multiple events per day. When we add up 
cumulative abnormal returns across events within one class, such overlaps become a serious 
methodological problem. We address this problem by introducing “multiple events” and 
“no events” as additional classes. After putting the event windows around the individual 
events, we assign each trading day to exactly one class. Each day that belongs to two or 
more event windows of different classes is assigned to the class “multiple events.” All other 
days that fall into one of the event windows are assigned to the class of the respective 
event. Finally, each day that does not belong to any event window is classified as “no 
events.” From the days in the “no events” class, we calculate the standard deviation of 
abnormal returns used for significance tests. In order to conserve space, we report our event 
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study results only for Phase 2, which is the key time period in our analysis. The results of 
the event study approach and the regression approach are very similar. 
4 Analysis and Evaluation 
4.1 Phase 1: Consolidate Core Businesses  
(January 1, 1994 – June 10, 1997) 
The first three and a half years of Michael Frenzel’s tenure at the helm of Preussag are 
marked by his attempt to turn the company around through a restructuring program 
described as “value-oriented development.” 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 contains the regression results from equations (1) and (2) for this period. The table 
displays the part of the total abnormal return that can be explained by three event groups: 
acquisitions, sell-offs, and news. Results are presented for four different event windows and 
two choices of the benchmark index. The main findings from Table 2 are robust to the 
different test specifications. Abnormal returns in all transaction categories are small and 
statistically and mostly also economically insignificant. Only the 67 news announcements – 
with one exception all disclosures of financial statements about Preussag and its 
subsidiaries – are highly significant and negative. Altogether, it seems that the decisions of 
Preussag’s management during the period 1994-1997 held little surprise for the stock 
market. However, financial disclosures were mostly negative and resulted in a cumulative 
underperformance of 22% to 43% over the whole period.13 Hence, Preussag consistently 
surprised the market with less than expected financial performance. 
As Preussag outperformed the market for the whole of 1994 by 12.0% (actual return), we 
conclude that the stock market initially subscribed to Preussag’s concept of a “value 
oriented” restructuring, and the transactions of the company were clearly geared towards 
this goal. Then the market slowly and steadily absorbed the less than promised impact of 
this strategy as it became reflected in Preussag’s financial performance, and completely lost 
heart in 1996: during that year, Preussag underperformed the CDAX by 58.4% (actual 
return). From this perspective, it is not surprising that Preussag’s management began to 
rethink its strategy at the beginning of 1997. 
4.2 Phase 2: Enter Tourism, Exit Core Businesses  
(June 11, 1997 – September 10, 2001) 
The second phase begins on June 11, 1997, when Preussag confirmed previous rumors that 
it bid for Hapag-Lloyd. This event marked a turning point, as tourism now became a major 
                                                          
13  All returns given in Sections 4.1 through 4.3 are log returns if not stated differently. 
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part of the company’s activities, accounting for 28% of sales in fiscal year 1997/98, and for 
57% in fiscal year 2001 (see Table 1). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 lists abnormal returns and short descriptions for the main events during phase 2 of 
our analysis. The first rumors regarding Preussag’s intention to buy Hapag-Lloyd circulated 
already on May 27 without moving the stock price. The announcement of the takeover itself 
on June 11 led to a statistically insignificant increase of Preussag’s share price. The final 
price of €532 per share – a 14% premium on the pre-announcement price – was announced 
only after negotiations concluded and became public on September 2, which led to a 
significant decline in Preussag’s stock. It is therefore difficult to discern from this an 
unambiguous reaction of the stock market to Preussag’s change of strategy, and the 
negative reaction to the last announcement may well imply that Preussag simply overpaid. 
It is certainly not clear how Preussag could justify a 14% premium for the purchase. As 
recently as 1996 Preussag had argued that its core competencies were in logistics, steel, and 
oil (Annual Report 1994/95, p. 9). Now they announced the transformation of the company 
into a “modern services company” (press statement dated September 3, 1997). 
Hapag-Lloyd also owned 30% of the tour operator TUI (Touristik Union International), and 
Preussag CEO Frenzel was quoted in the press on June 12, a day after announcing the bid 
for Hapag-Lloyd, that they were also interested in acquiring another 30% stake from 
WestLB in order to obtain majority control. Clearly, the Hapag-Lloyd takeover set the stage 
for a stronger engagement in tourism and services. Industry observers, including the federal 
cartel office, Germany’s antitrust regulator, perceived the emergence of a duopoly for the 
German holiday market with Preussag, Hapag-Lloyd and LTU on one side, and C&N with 
its holdings Condor and NUR as their only main competitor on the other side. The later 
purchases of the other TUI stakes from Deutsche Bahn, the state-owned German railway 
operator, and the Schickedanz group (see Table 3) was probably anticipated by the market 
and did not cause significant movements of Preussag’s stock price.  
With the acquisition of Thomas Cook, a large British tour operator, travel agency chain and 
financial service provider, Preussag’s expansion into tourism reached an international 
dimension. On October 9, 1998, the press reported rumors about Preussag’s ambitions to 
buy Thomas Cook for the first time. At that time, Thomas Cook planned to merge its 
activities with the British interests of US-based Carlson Companies, Inc. The decision 
became official only in December, but evidently the stock market took this announcement 
seriously and reacted enthusiastically with the CAR measured over the (0, 2) event window 
reaching 9%. The staged acquisition of Thomas Cook from WestLB (a 24.9% stake in 
December 1998, followed by another 25.2% in September 1999) itself did not cause the 
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stock price to move. Evidently the purchase price was more in line with the market’s 
expectations in this case. The reaction to the first announcement suggests either that the 
market endorsed Preussag’s move into tourism at this time, or that WestLB sold Thomas 
Cook to Preussag for too low a value. WestLB is not listed, so we can only look at the 
return to this investment for Preussag as they sold Thomas Cook at a premium in December 
2000. The internal rate of return from their investment is 74% when the stock market 
gained only 23% over the same period.14 This favors the hypothesis that WestLB sold 
Thomas Cook to Preussag at a discount. 
In 2000, Preussag increased their engagement in the UK and consolidated their investment 
in tourism by purchasing Thomson Travel Group plc, the largest UK tourism group. Before 
Preussag became interested, Thomson Travel had been engaged in negotiations with C&N 
about a merger during April 2000. C&N had bid first 130 pence and then 145 pence per 
share for Thomson Travel, which put a price tag of €2.42 billion on Thomson Travel. On 
April 12, 2000, Frenzel discussed this development at Preussag’s annual general meeting 
and described this price as “extremely high.” He expressed “no interest” at the time and 
said Preussag’s attitude to this regrouping of their competitors as “extremely relaxed.” 
Exactly one month later, on May 15, 2000, C&N had increased its bid to 160 pence per 
share (€2.67 billion) when Preussag announced that it would top the C&N-offer with a 
spectacular 180 pence per Thomson Travel share (€2.8 billion), about twice its valuation 
before takeover rumors first reached the market.15 Frenzel now argued that Thomson is “a 
British TUI” that would offer Preussag “the chance for a quantum leap for the expansion of 
its tourism operations” and a “unique opportunity.” Industry commentators were less 
impressed, pointing out the lack of synergies, Thomson’s meager sales margin (3% 
compared to an industry average of 4%), the fact that Thomson had lost almost half of its 
170 pence per share value after its IPO in May 1998, and the fact that EU competition 
authorities would require Preussag to divest Thomas Cook again in order not to obtain too 
strong a position on the British market.16 The stock market clearly took a negative view. All 
CARs reported in Table 3 for the date first rumors became known (Friday, May 12) and on 
the subsequent official announcement (Monday, May 15) are significantly negative at the 
1%-level. As these event windows overlap, the most informative statistic is the cumulative 
                                                          
14  Preussag paid €146 million for the first stake on December 23, 1998 (M&A Review, 2/1999, p. 101) and 
€147 million for the second stake by exercising their purchase option on September 30, 1999. They sold 
all their holdings on December 5, 2000 for €461 million (Handelsblatt, December 8, 2000, p. 22). 
15  The precise measurement depends on the reference date, which is difficult to determine, as there was a 
run-up as early as March and April 2000. This run-up was possibly caused by rumors in the market, but a 
part of it may be attributed to fundamental information about Thomson. The stock price on the date before 
C&N’s first offer was 95.25 pence. Preussag’s bid premium was 89% relative to this price. 
16  Handelsblatt, May 16, 2000, p. 2, and Wall Street Journal Europe, May 16, 2000, p. 4 
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abnormal return from May 11 to May 17, which is –15.3% representing a loss of €1.19 
billion of Preussag’s market capitalization. This is approximately equal to the premium 
€1.23 billion Preussag paid for Thomson Travel on the pre-takeover price, so none of the 
synergies and economies of scale emphasized by management seemed to justify such a 
premium from the market’s point of view and this sum simply represented a transfer of 
wealth from Preussag’s shareholders to Thomson Travel’s shareholders. On May 15 
Preussag also published interim semi-annual financial reports, but these were wholly 
favorable, above the previous year’s results and in line with the market’s expectations, so 
we classify May 15, 2000 as a tourism acquisition and disregard the financial statements as 
a potentially disturbing event. 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
Table 4 reports the regression results for the period from the Hapag-Lloyd announcement 
up to and including September 10, 2001. Of the 29 tourism acquisition announcements, 16 
are also listed in detail in Table 3. We distinguish purchases from WestLB (6 
announcements) from all other tourism acquisitions (23 announcements) and find that 
purchases from WestLB generate a cumulative positive 9% to 16%, whereas all other 
tourism acquisitions lead to a cumulative abnormal returns of –17% to –52%. Table 5 
displays the corresponding event study results that are similar in magnitude but generally 
show somewhat higher levels of significance than the regression results in Table 4. Table 5 
also demonstrates that all tourism acquisitions together result in a cumulated loss of value 
between 10% and 35%, although this is often statistically insignificant.17 Results become 
significant, however, once we distinguish between purchases from WestLB and other 
purchases. Hence, purchases negotiated under market conditions generated highly 
significant negative returns, whereas the “friendly” purchases from WestLB (in particular 
the acquisition of Thomas Cook) where favorable for Preussag. This finding is consistent 
with the general observation that tender offers and bidding competition generally create 
lower and mostly negative bidder returns compared to prices established through bilateral 
negotiations. For example, in a study of bidders that make multiple acquisitions, Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find that returns to the acquisition of public targets are 
significantly lower than those to the acquisition of privately held firms or subsidiaries 
(controlling for the identity of the bidder). Altogether, we therefore conclude that entering 
                                                          
17  An advantage of the event study method is that the two classes “Tourism acquisitions from WestLB” and 
“Other tourism acquisitions” can be merged without changing the results for the other classes of events. 
For Phases 1 and 3, the event study method and the regression method yield quantitatively very similar 
results. Generally, the event study results turn out to be slightly more significant than the regression 
results. We therefore do not present the event study results for Phases 1 and 3. 
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tourism destroyed shareholder value. In total, Preussag’s shareholders paid a price of 
€0.402 - €1.343 billion for this change of strategy.18 
As the stock price of Preussag increased relative to the market index during the 1997-2001 
phase, we now need to understand where the increase in wealth came from if not from a 
successful engagement in tourism. Tables 4 and 5 suggest that there was another part of 
Preussag’s strategy in this period that seemed to be uniquely successful: the divestiture of 
its former core businesses in steel, non-ferrous metals, plant construction, and building 
engineering. 25 sell-off announcements fall into this period, 7 of which are listed in Table 
3. The cumulated return to these sell-offs is positive and large overall and often highly 
significant. The reason for these sell-offs was to obtain money for further investments in 
tourism and logistics as it appears that Preussag paid cash in all its acquisitions.19 Other 
news also had a significant impact on Preussag’s stock price as Table 3 shows. Since the 
market reaction is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, the aggregated effect of 
‘other news’ shown in Tables 4 and 5 is not significant. 
Our main conclusion is therefore that Preussag’s management generated considerable value 
for its shareholders during the period from 1997 to 2001 by divesting their former lines of 
business. Unfortunately, they did not pay out the proceeds to their shareholders but 
reinvested them in the acquisition of tourism companies instead. The market did not grant 
Preussag’s management any specialized skills in this area and seemed to subtract the 
takeover premiums they paid – notably in the disastrous acquisition of Thomson Travel – 
one for one from their market value. At the end of this phase, Preussag was mainly a 
focused tourism and logistics group. At that point, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 brought the period where tourism was a growing, profitable industry to an immediate 
halt. 
4.3 Phase 3: Consolidate Tourism (2001-2004) 
In the period between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2004, Preussag 
underperformed the CDAX by 49.8%. Was the poor performance of Preussag’s stock just 
bad luck? We approach this question in the same way as before. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 displays our regression results for this period. Clearly, no category of events 
accounts for significant stock price changes in one direction or another. Interestingly, 
                                                          
18  For this comparison, we use the numbers from Table 5, Panel A and multiply the CARs with the market 
capitalization on June 10, 1997 of €3.892 billion. 
19  There is no source to confirm this but none of the news sources we studied ever mentions stock or other 
securities as acquisition currency. The same holds true for all sell-offs except their shipbuilding and plant 
construction to Babcock, where they accepted Babcock shares in return. 
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“tourism news” as a group is insignificant over this period. Preussag’s stock lost 33.1% 
(actual return) within the first 10 days after September 11, an underperformance of the 
index of 20.6% (actual return). However, this and subsequent events like the Iraq war were 
later compensated by positive news and reassessments by the market. This picture is 
confirmed by looking at the industry-weighted index, which controls – at least partially – 
for tourism-specific events. Table 6 shows that the magnitude of “tourism news” is always 
smaller for the weighted industry benchmark than for the CDAX. In fact, Preussag’s 
cumulative abnormal return relative to this index was -81%, indicating that more must be at 
work here than just a bet on tourism that went wrong ex post. Most of the 
underperformance during this period falls into the category “unexplained returns,” i. e. 
those days where no particular event or news item can be found from any of our sources of 
information.20 Note that during this period, the German stock market underperforms the 
European stock market. The industry-weighted index (in Phase 3 largely tourism) is a 
European index with a stronger performance than the German market but weaker than the 
European market at large. Preussag underperformed all of them. 
During this period, Preussag’s management reacted with standard retrenchment measures. 
They tried to cut costs in its tourism operations, and to experiment with new products and 
distribution channels. During 2002, these efforts neither showed any visible success nor did 
they show which direction management intended to take. For example, on June 19, 2002 
they announced a new brand to sell last minute holidays, imitating a strategy of their 
competitor C&N. On October 10 of the same year they announced an expansion of their 
luxury segment, arguing that it had higher margins. Neither announcement impressed the 
stock market. 
In 2003 Preussag (now renamed TUI) announced a new brand “Discount Travel” to expand 
its franchise in the budget travel market, and was rewarded with an 8.8% increase of its 
stock price on the same day. However, a few days later Frenzel announced a “restructuring” 
(effectively shrinking) of the management board that also included the dismissal of both 
tourism specialists on the board without replacement. Analysts were mostly outraged by the 
prospect of having Europe’s largest tourism company led by a management without any 
tourism expertise and downgraded the stock. Preussag lost almost 12% of its market value 
as a consequence. 
                                                          
20  We were skeptical that this could be true and went back to search for news on dates of large stock price 
movements. We found one announcement in Phase 2 related to speculations about a reweighing of the 
DAX. On other dates, all of them in Phase 3, market commentators talked about “revaluations” without 
being able to point out significant new information. We discuss press and analysts’ coverage in Section 
5.2. 
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Overall, Preussag’s management struggled with the impact of an increasingly hostile 
environment after September 11, 2001 – as did most tourism companies. They tried to cut 
costs, strengthened the luxury segment and later the low cost segment of their operations, 
fired managers and reorganized internally. Still, the stock market turned its back on the 
company more than it did on its competitors. Ultimately, the business model of Preussag 
did not convince the market. 
4.4 Overall assessment 
Preussag’s decision to shift gears in 1997 and to give up on their original restructuring plan 
was well motivated given that previous efforts did not have the desired impact on their 
performance. However, choices other than simply continuing to struggle with their 
traditional lines of business or entering tourism were clearly available. In this section we 
investigate one particular alternative more closely that is suggested by our analysis of Phase 
2: simply liquidate the company and pay out the funds to shareholders. Naturally, as mature 
industries stagnate and shrink, some companies need to exit these markets, and if their 
managers do not have skills to add value in another industry, then the company should 
simply liquidate itself. We analyze the following strategies: 21 
1) Execute Preussag’s divestiture program precisely as they did during the period 1997-
2004. On September 30, 1997, use all cash available at that time to pay off debt and 
invest the remaining cash in our tourism and transport index.22 Use all subsequent 
proceeds from sales of businesses and invest them in the same index on the date of the 
sale. Similarly, whenever any of the traditional businesses generate free operating cash 
flows, invest those in the same way. We attribute these cash flows to the last day of the 
fiscal year. This strategy assumes the position of an investor who wants to invest in 
tourism and logistics rather than in metal trading, shipbuilding and Preussag’s other 
businesses. However, this investor would put her money into a broad portfolio of 
logistics and tourism companies rather than those chosen by Preussag. Table 7 shows 
that this would have generated a balance of €11,372 billion on December 31, 2004. 
2) Proceed as under 1, but now reinvest cash, free operating cash flows, and sales proceeds 
from sell-offs in the CDAX. This assumes the position of an investor who simply 
wanted to exit from Preussag’s businesses and put the money into a broad stock market 
portfolio. This strategy would have generated a balance of €9,206 billion. 
                                                          
21  In order to estimate exact values for the different strategies we did not use log returns, but actual returns 
for calculating the index returns. This ensures comparability with the actual history of Preussag’s stock 
until December, 31, 2004.  
22  It would be preferable to start this analysis on June 10, 1997 but we are limited to balance sheet data 
available for the end of the fiscal year 1996/97 and cannot base this analysis on events before that. 
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3) Assume the company could have been sold to another investor on June 10, 1997, who 
would then have proceeded as he wished. Assume the sale price would have been the 
market value on that date, which was €3.892 billion, then reinvest these proceeds in the 
stock market. In this scenario, an investment in the tourism and transport index would 
have generated €5.794 billion by the end of 2004. 
4) Proceed as in 3), but now reinvest in the CDAX. Then the resulting value at the end of 
2004 would have been €4.495 billion. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Preussag’s value (including reinvested dividends) was in fact only €3.333 billion at the end 
of 2004. The following table compares the results from the four alternatives described 
above to the actual result: 
Strategy Description Value (bn) on December 31, 2004
Change to 
status quo 
0 Actual history (status quo) 3.333  -  
1 Liquidate as in history, reinvest 
proceeds in tourism and transport 
portfolio 11.372  8.039  
2 As (1), reinvest in CDAX 9.206  5.873  
3 Invest the market value of 
Preussag in tourism and transport 
portfolio 5.794  2.461  
4 Invest the market value of 
Preussag in CDAX 4.495  1.162  
The high values for strategies 1 and 2 compared to strategies 3 and 4 reflect the value 
created through the redeployment of assets. It shows that Preussag’s exit strategy was 
successful. With hindsight, they were even correct in betting on tourism and logistics, as the 
portfolio reflected in our tourism and transport index outperformed the CDAX by 33% over 
the period from June 10, 1997 to December 31, 2004. However, Preussag’s management 
should never have undertaken these investments themselves, as their actual strategy 
destroyed more than €1.1 billion relative to a passive investment in the stock market, and 
more than €8 billion relative to the optimal strategy of liquidating the company and leaving 
it to shareholders to use the proceeds to invest in tourism and logistics companies. 
Ultimately, this is the range of values lost by Preussag’s shareholders, and, in the final 
conclusion, by the German taxpayer who participated in this enterprise by virtue of 
WestLB’s shareholdings. WestLB sold its stake in Preussag in December 2004 for €950 
million. Therefore, given our four alternative strategies above, €0.4 billion to €2.6 billion of 
German taxpayer’s money was wasted by the disastrous strategy of Preussag’s 
management. Interestingly this enormous destruction of taxpayer’s wealth was never 
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discussed in the press. The issue was also never raised in the state parliament, presumably 
because the extent of the value destruction was not apparent. Some newspapers even 
reported that WestLB was able to realize a book profit (see e.g. Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, December 2, 2004, p. 15). 
5 Why things went wrong – the larger context 
In this section we wish to understand why the story of Preussag could develop as it did. We 
therefore analyze decision-making and corporate governance at Preussag. We also put the 
case of Preussag into a larger context and draw more general conclusions. 
5.1 The Agenda of Preussag’s Management 
When Preussag’s management shifted the company’s strategy to tourism in 1997, they 
explained this move in a letter to the shareholders as part of a “comprehensive 
modernization of Preussag” and they motivated the focus on tourism as “an industry with 
sustainable growth prospects.” (Preussag, Annual Report 1997/98, pp. 7-8). However, 
efficient markets would discount the higher growth prospects of tourism companies into 
their prices and we therefore need to ask how Preussag could justify any acquisition 
premiums. Preussag’s move towards focusing is in general agreement with the notion that 
diversification destroys value, but Preussag was focusing on something unrelated to its 
former business.23 
Preussag developed the concept of a vertically “integrated tourism company” that would 
control all stages of the value chain from travel agencies to airlines and hotels.24 Their 
argument was that travel agencies would help to divert tourists to company-owned hotels 
and airlines and thereby increase capacity utilization. Standard arguments in industrial 
organization suggest that vertical integration may be helpful in overcoming hold-up 
problems or inefficiencies from double marginalization, but none of these advantages 
seems to be present here as all segments of the tourism market – with the exception of 
airlines – feature either a large number of suppliers, or low costs of entry and unspecialized 
assets (see Section 4.2). When market relationships dominate, standard textbook analysis 
emphasizes the costs of integration, as integration increases the scope for agency costs and 
influence activities and prevents the full exploitation of scale and learning economies. 
These arguments are never reflected in Preussag’s press releases or annual reports. 
                                                          
23  See Martin and Sayrak (2003) for a survey of the literature on diversification and its consequences. Some 
authors argue that the diversification discount is not caused by diversification (see Graham, Lemmon, and 
Wolf, 2002, and Villalonga, 2004). Moreover, results for Germany indicate a lower diversification 
discount than for the U.S. (Lins and Servaes, 1999).  
24  Annual report 1996/97 p. 8, Annual report 1997/98 p. 8 and pp. 23, 38, 89. 
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The bid for Thomson Travel was inconsistent with Preussag’s proclaimed strategy. At the 
time Preussag already had a significant stake in the British market with Thomas Cook. 
However, Thomson Travel was significantly larger and would otherwise have been 
acquired by C&N, Preussag’s smaller German competitor. Frenzel was possibly frank about 
his true ambition when he commented that this acquisition “(…) secures our position as the 
biggest player in Europe” (Wall Street Journal Europe, May 16, 2000, p. 4). Exactly why 
size would matter for a tourism company and how size could be translated into value 
creation was never explained. The large number of small tourism companies suggests that 
economies of scale are limited, and academic studies show that the benefits from mergers 
and acquisitions do not derive from building market power (see Ravenscraft and Scherer, 
1987, Mueller, 1985, and Eckbo, 1992). 
Our analysis suggests that Preussag’s migration from steel and mining to tourism was not 
the outcome of a well-formulated strategic concept but the result of the ambitions of its 
management, for which shareholders ultimately had to pay the price. At this stage it appears 
that Preussag’s strategy corresponds more to what Roll (1986) described as “hubris,” 
namely the tendency of corporate managers – epitomized in Warren Buffet’s quote at the 
beginning of the Introduction – to overbid for companies they want to control.25 Before we 
subscribe to this view we investigate if Preussag’s strategy generated benefits for its 
management in Section 5.3. 
5.2 The Role of Analysts and the Press 
The press and analysts paid close attention to Preussag’s dramatic transformation and here 
we would hope for some more detailed critical comments that would emphasize the risks 
and downsides in Preussag’s strategy. In order to compile our dataset we analyze a total of 
2,000 newspaper articles and press releases but find little to this effect before 2003, and 
nothing in the phase before 2000. The press and analysts commented repeatedly on tourism 
as a “new growth area” that would offer new opportunities to Preussag in comparison to its 
traditional businesses, and Preussag became a model case of “business migration.” 
Comments by Olaf Toelke, an analyst with Merrill Lynch (Frankfurt) are exemplary when 
he writes: ”The company has come out of its cyclical corner and is now growth-oriented.”26 
Stock market analysts apparently supported Preussag’s move to become more focused on 
tourism and to leave its former core businesses behind. The fact that Preussag’s 
management focused on an industry they did not know before received little attention. 
                                                          
25  For empirical evidence on the hubris hypothesis see e. g. Raj and Forsyth (2003) and the earlier literature 
cited by them. 
26  The Wall Street Journal Europe, February 2, 1999. The term “business migration” was explicitly used in 
the press, see Handelsblatt, February 10, 2000, p. 56. 
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Our analysis has shown that Preussag’s stock outperformed the market during 1997-2001 
only because of its divestitures, but many commentators and analysts argued otherwise. In 
fact, when the stock price took a dip in early 2000, a major newspaper argued, “tourism 
increases the stock price” and even attributed the recent price drop to Preussag’s failure to 
undertake more acquisitions.27 Obviously, analysts did not realize that Preussag 
outperformed the general stock market in spite of its investments in tourism and not 
because of them. This raises the issue of the status of analysts, as they were not only unable 
to convince investors of their analysis, but even failed to understand market signals 
correctly. 
5.3 Executive compensation and private benefits 
Board seats on other companies. Our first hypothesis is that managers must have gained 
from the strategy change at Preussag, either through increased compensation or through 
private benefits. German companies do not disclose itemized private benefits as US 
companies do, but a measurable indicator of private benefits is the status and prestige 
conferred on the CEO in the form of additional board seats of other companies. Michael 
Frenzel is Preussag’s CEO during the entire period under consideration here. He joined 
Preussag’s management board in 1988 at age 40 and became CEO in 1994 at age 46. 
Previously, he had spent seven years at WestLB, Preussag’s major shareholder, where he 
was responsible for managing WestLB’s blockholdings in industrial companies. In 1997/98 
Frenzel holds board memberships in seven mostly smaller companies28, three of which are 
only subsidiaries and another three are state-owned. Over the following seven years, he 
gives up these seven positions and becomes board member in seven other, bigger firms, 
including two of Germany’s top 30 listed companies.29 He is also chairman of the board of 
Germany’s state-owned railway operator, and of one of Germany’s ten largest banks. 
During this time Frenzel benefited particularly from his close relationship to his mentor 
Friedel Neuber, chairman of Preussag’s supervisory board and CEO of WestLB (see Figure 
1A). He followed him into the supervisory board of at least three companies, where Neuber 
was on the supervisory board before him.30 Frenzel also seemed to be in demand for CEO 
                                                          
27  Handelsblatt, February 18, 2000, p. 16, quoting Christian Obst (an analyst with Hypo-Vereinsbank) and 
Rolf Geck (analyst with WGZ-Bank). 
28 Deutsche Hypothekenbank AG, IVG Holding AG, PreussenElektra AG, Creditanstalt AG, Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau, Hamburgische Landesbank, Expo 2000 Hannover GmbH. 
29 AXA Konzern AG, Continental AG, Deutsche Bahn AG, Volkswagen AG, Norddeutsche Landesbank, 
E.ON Energie AG, ING Bank Deutschland AG. 
30 Neuber was on the board of Deutsche Bahn AG from 1997– 2004, Frenzel follows 1999; Neuber is on the 
board of AXA S. A. from 1997– 2001, Frenzel joints AXA Colonia AG’s board in 1998, Neuber was on 
the board of Bank Austria AG from 1997 – 2000, Frenzel is on Creditanstalt’s (acquired by Bank Austria 
in 1998) board. In all cases we provide the earliest date of board membership we can establish, so board 
membership may have existed before. 
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positions at other German companies.31 We can therefore conclude that during the period 
1997-2004 Frenzel gained significantly in terms of status and prestige and potentially also 
in terms of his value in the market for managerial labor. This raises a more general 
question. Some authors, going back to Fama (1980), argue that the market for managerial 
labor acts as a check on managerial discretion, because managers will not exercise this 
discretion to the disdadvantage of shareholders in order not to reduce the value of their own 
human capital. Our analysis casts doubt on Fama’s theory being an accurate description of 
the German market for managerial labor. 
Executive compensation. German companies do not have to disclose individual salaries or 
compensation plans and we only have data on the total compensation of the management 
board and can therefore only infer averages. Table 8 illustrates that management board 
members received an average fixed salary of €630,000 - €650,000 annually during the 
period 1994-1997, which puts it significantly above the average for German corporations 
with more than €1 billion sales, which was €420,000 in 1996 (see Schwalbach, 1999). After 
1997, compensation increases dramatically as this fixed salary is complemented by 
“performance related” pay. This is a €500,000 of bonus dependent on dividend payouts and 
a phantom stock scheme, where managers can sell phantom shares at the actual share price 
after a vesting period of two years.32 Management board members received €7.7 million 
worth of phantom stock during 2001-2003 that lost approximately €3.4 million during the 
same period.33 As a result, the average salary of Preussag’s management board members 
increased by 279% from €526,000 in fiscal year 1993/94 to €1,992,000 in fiscal year 2004 
(see Table 8).34 Therefore, while Preussag’s shareholders did not benefit from the 
company’s tourism strategy, its management certainly did. The overall increase in 
compensation can rationalize why Preussag’s management was concerned with size. While 
the company did not increase in value, it did increase in sales and total assets (see Table 1 
for sales, the development of assets is similar). This is consistent with the general result that 
managers benefit from acquisitions when these increase size and thereby lead to higher 
managerial salaries. This view can be dated back to Baumol (1959) and evidence for the 
U.S. was found by Khorana and Zenner (1998). 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
                                                          
31  RWE (Die Welt am Sonntag, April 28, 2002), where Neuber is chairmen of the supervisory board, and 
Deutsche Telekom (press release of Preussag, July 12, 2002). 
32  To sell phantom stocks after the vesting period no absolute or relative performance target has to be met, 
which is unusual for German compensation practice. 
33  Preussag Annual Report 2002, pp. 207-208, Preussag Annual report 2003, pp. 206-207. 
34  In fiscal year 2004 Preussag disclosed individual salaries for the first time. Michael Frenzel earned 
€3,220,000 in 2004 (Preussag Annual Report 2004, pp. 196-197). 
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Our compensation analysis also suggests that contracts did not align the interests of 
management with those of shareholders. Management board members together held 1,690 
shares worth €27,000 and representing about 0.001% of Preussag’s capital in 2002.35 So 
compensation on the whole had practically no relationship to performance, in line with the 
practice of most German companies until the late 1990s.36 The question of how much 
performance sensitivity would constitute a sufficiently high-powered compensation 
contract is open to debate. Jensen and Murphy (1990) establish that US CEOs receive an 
additional $3.25 for every $1,000 of shareholder value they create and regard this value as 
too low. Murphy (1999) points out that the picture had changed during the 1990s when 
performance sensitivity increased. Schwalbach and Graßhoff (1997) indicate that the 
situation is generally worse in Germany than in the United States. Preussag’s pay for 
performance sensitivity was just 1 cent for every thousand euros of shareholder value 
created, a number that falls short of Jensen and Murphy’s number and that appears too low 
to provide effective incentive alignment. 
The case of Preussag therefore corroborates the findings of Mehran, Nogler, and Schwartz 
(1998) who document a relationship between voluntary liquidation decisions and CEO 
incentives. An example of a case where good alignment of incentives created shareholder 
value through a partial liquidation is General Dynamics (see Dial and Murphy, 1995). 
However, Mehran, Nogler, and Schwartz (1998) also point to the importance of 
complementary governance structures, particularly the board of directors, to induce 
voluntary liquidations, a subject to which we turn next. 
5.4 Ownership and Control: The Role of WestLB 
A change in strategy could have been forced upon management by its large shareholders or 
its supervisory board. Typically, this would take the form of replacing management with 
one that is more likely to execute a strategy that is in the interest of shareholders. However, 
Frenzel, who assumed the position of CEO on January 1, 1994 still held this position eleven 
years later, after initially failing to restructure the core business, and then failing equally at 
guiding Preussag to a more profitable future by entering a new industry. Generally, the rate 
of CEO turnover for German companies is high (see Kaplan, 1994), and this continuity is 
therefore surprising. This outcome can be easily understood, however, if we look at the 
distribution of votes and the composition of the supervisory board. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
                                                          
35  Preussag Annual Report 2002 pp. 208-209. At the end of 2003 the shareholdings of the management board 
dropped to 784 shares worth €13,000 or about 0.0005% (Preussag Annual Report 2003, p. 208). The 
number of shares stayed constant in 2004 (Preussag Annual Report 2004, p. 198). 
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Voting power. WestLB has been the only major blockholder at Preussag since 1969 (see 
Section 2 and Figure 1A). Table 9 displays data on WestLB’s voting power in nine of the 
ten annual general meetings of Preussag during the period under consideration. On average, 
57% of the capital was represented and WestLB had 59.2% of the votes represented by 
virtue of its direct shareholdings, sufficient to command a majority at four of these 
meetings. At another four meetings WestLB commanded the majority jointly with 
Niedersachsen Holding (see Figure 1A). At the one remaining meeting on March 31, 1999 
WestLB commanded 49.3% of the votes, just short of a majority. We therefore conclude 
that WestLB dominated Preussag through its voting power. 
Supervisory board.37 The supervisory board of Preussag is subject to the German co-
determination act, so half of its twenty members are representatives of workers and the 
other half represent shareholders. Of the latter, two are representatives of WestLB as its 
major shareholder and Neuber, CEO of WestLB, is also the chairman of Preussag’s 
supervisory board throughout the entire period.38 Figure 4 demonstrates that WestLB 
strengthened its influence through board interlocks. At any time at least two of Preussag’s 
supervisory board members were members of the management board in other firms in 
which Neuber was also chairman of the supervisory board (RWE) or at least held 
supervisory board memberships (like Deutsche Bahn or ThyssenKrupp). The supervisory 
board also included representatives of other German banks and corporations, an 
independent (Frantz Vranitzky, former social-democratic chancellor of Austria) and an 
organization representing small shareholders (DSW). Only this last supervisory board 
member should have had a clear interest in furthering shareholder value, but we are not 
aware that he ever raised his voice. On December 31, 2002, when the shareholdings of the 
supervisory board were disclosed for the first time, all board members together held 
0.002% of Preussag’s shares (Preussag, Annual Report 2002, pp. 208-209). Economists 
have always viewed board interlocks with skepticism (the classic reference is Dooley, 
1969). Loderer and Peyer (2002) and Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider (2005) relate 
interlocks to performance. Loderer and Peyer (2002) show for a sample of Swiss firms that 
the proportion of directors who are also directors on the board of a bank has a negative 
impact on Tobin’s q. Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider (2005) show that bank representation 
on the board causes lower valuations of German companies. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
36  This calculation of performance sensitivity does not include the phantom stock scheme that was 
introduced in 2001 (Preussag’s Annual Report, 2002), as we do not know the parameters of this scheme. 
37  All the information about supervisory board meetings and committees are taken from the annual reports of 
Preussag from 1994 to 2004 (Bericht des Aufsichtsratsvorsitzenden). 
38  Friedel Neuber unexpectedly died at the age of 69 on October, 23, 2004. 
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We conclude that WestLB’s voting power was matched by the control it exercised over 
Preussag’s supervisory board. We therefore need to understand why WestLB was unwilling 
to use its hold on Preussag in order to push for a more shareholder-friendly strategy and 
why, in particular, it failed to prevent the catastrophic acquisition of Thomson Travel. 
WestLB itself is state-owned and its management is accountable only to the political 
representatives of North Rhine Westphalia, Germany’s largest and most populous state. The 
governance structure of WestLB itself does not impress any particular profit motive or 
incentive for value maximization on its management. To the contrary, the bank serves a 
distinct political purpose and repeatedly used its financial muscle to prevent decisions that 
would increase shareholder value but conflict with other, politically defined interests. 
Examples include the prevention of layoffs at financially distressed firms or of relocations 
of headquarters or production facilities into another state.39 Beyond its politically defined 
objectives WestLB’s management seems to enjoy considerable freedom in shaping its 
policies. 
When Preussag entered tourism, WestLB already had a number of large, if not controlling 
stakes in other tourism companies (see Figure 1A). Preussag’s engagement in tourism 
opened the opportunity for WestLB to divest itself of its tourism assets. Preussag bought 
WestLB’s TUI-stakes and 50.1% of its Thomas Cook block. Preussag also bought 
WestLB’s 22% stake in the First chain of travel agencies. Hence, it is at least plausible that 
WestLB found Preussag to be a willing partner to divest themselves of their tourism 
holdings. It is therefore natural to suppose that Preussag was merely a victim of a policy 
forced upon it by its large shareholder. However, in the transactions where Preussag bought 
assets from WestLB, notably in the case of Thomas Cook, Preussag’s stock gained and 
these gains are economically and sometimes also statistically significant (see Section 4.2). 
We therefore conclude that WestLB sold its assets to Preussag at a discount to their 
intrinsic value, which is clearly inconsistent with WestLB abusing its power over Preussag. 
A more plausible interpretation is that Preussag continued a strategy initially formulated 
and pursued by Neuber and WestLB. When WestLB collected its tourism stakes in the 
period 1989 – 1997, the press speculated repeatedly about Neuber’s overall strategy.40 Press 
speculation just days before the announcement of the Hapag Lloyd takeover (Die Zeit, June 
6, 1997 p. 17) discussed the different possibilities available to WestLB: either to divest its 
tourism holdings by merging them into a new, independent company, or by merging them 
                                                          
39  Examples of such interventions include Horten AG and Geresheimer Glas (Handelsblatt, December 3, 
1990 p. 21), LTU (Handelsblatt, December 24, 2001, p. 12) and Babcock (Handelsblatt, January 17, 2003, 
p. 10). 
40  Examples include Handelsblatt, June 29, 1990. Handelsblatt, June 5, 1992 p. 21, Die Zeit, January 6, 1995 
and Handelsblatt February 21, 1995. The last article argues that Neuber plans an IPO of WestLB’s tourism 
holdings in the medium term. 
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with those of Preussag. It therefore appears that Frenzel completed a former project of 
Neuber, but without creating tangible benefits for either Preussag or WestLB. 
In the final conclusion we therefore caution against the notion that large controlling 
shareholders are always a blessing as they help to overcome the separation of ownership 
and control. The literature on large shareholder monitoring typically assumes that large 
blockholders have a strong interest in maximizing shareholder value and ignores the 
additional agency conflicts if these large shareholders are companies or institutions.41 In the 
case of Preussag, however, the largest shareholder is an intermediary whose management 
has ambitions of its own. Our findings are more in line with the view of Franks and Mayer 
(2001) that the gains from block trades in Germany are not shared with minority 
shareholders: they are mainly about private benefits from control.42 
Our findings also lend some support to the more general view that poor governance arises 
almost inevitably from combinations of public with private governance as it results in 
incompatible supervisory mechanisms and in a lack of accountability. Aktas, de Bodt, and 
Liagre (2003) summarize their reading of the literature on state-owned enterprises and 
privatizations in the same way, arguing that the government protects the interests of 
employees and other constituencies more than shareholders and that managers are hardly 
ever held accountable.43 We view the state ownership of WestLB as a contributing factor 
rather than as a prime cause because the agency problem within WestLB discussed above 
would exist even for a privately owned bank. 
5.5 Conflicts of Interest 
We conclude this section with a discussion of conflicts of interest in Preussag’s corporate 
governance structure. We show that these are obvious and significant but contribute little to 
the explanation of Preussag’s underperformance. 
Political affiliations. Both Neuber and Frenzel were members of the social democratic 
party (SPD), Germany’s labor party. Relationships within this party seem to have played a 
                                                          
41  This literature is devoted to the role of large shareholders in helping shareholders to overcome the free-
rider problem when they need to take action against management. It dates back at least to Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986). Contributions include Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994), Bolton and von Thadden 
(1998), Kahn and Winton (1998), Maug (1998), who all focus exclusively on shareholders’ collective 
action problem. 
42  See also Dyck and Zingales (2004) for an international comparison of private benefits of control measured 
from block trade data. 
43  See Megginson and Netter (2001) for a survey of the empirical literature on privatizations, especially their 
table 1 (p. 333) that summarizes 10 empirical studies, 9 of which find underperformance of state-owned 
enterprises compared to private enterprises. In a study of 50 international airlines, Backx, Carney, and 
Gedajlovic (2002) also investigate mixed public and private ownership, which is also the case of Preussag. 
They find that mixed ownership companies underperform privately owned companies, but not as much as 
fully state-owned enterprises. 
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particular role in the sale of Preussag’s steel business to a holding controlled by the state of 
Lower Saxony under its then prime minister Gerhard Schröder. According to one magazine 
report, Schröder was surprised to learn so late of Frenzel’s and Neuber’s plans to sell 
Preussag’s steel business to an Austrian company.44 Preussag initially negotiated with the 
Austrian group Voest-Alpine, but Gerhard Schröder, then fighting for re-election as prime 
minister of Lower Saxony, could not afford to confront the unions and Preussag 
steelworkers and therefore agreed to purchase the stakes from Preussag in order to buy time 
for an IPO. Preussag management board member Wolfgang Schultze was a representative 
of the SPD in the Lower Saxonian legislature and Bodo Hombach, CEO of Preussag’s steel 
trading unit became chief of staff of chancellor Schröder’s office in the fall of 1998. With 
Neuber and Frenzel this includes five members of this party on all sides of the transaction, 
which ousted Austrian Voest Alpine from the negotiations. While Preussag asserted that the 
offers by the state of Lower Saxony and Voest Alpine where of “equivalent value,” the 
Voest Alpine offer was structured differently, including a 20% stake in a joint venture with 
Preussag, and valued by some to be higher by about €100 million.45 It is conceivable that 
party affiliations also played a role when Preussag wanted to take over the 25% stake of 
TUI held by Deutsche Bahn (DB), Germany’s state-owned railway company. They could 
not agree with DB on a price under the then conservative government. When Schröder 
became Chancellor of Germany in September 1998, Preussag’s luck turned: negotiations 
went more smoothly and Preussag acquired the DB-stake in April 1999.46 
Lack of arms-length bargaining. Our event-study analysis suggests that Preussag 
overpaid for Hapag-Lloyd, as their share price dropped when the final sales price was 
announced (see Table 3). Here two blockholders, owning 10% of Hapag-Lloyd’s shares 
each, were Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank (see Figure 1A). Both were also represented 
on Preussag’s supervisory board at the same time (see Figure 4), so that from this point of 
view there was a conflict of interest as these supervisory board members represented buyer 
interests and seller interests at the same time. 
The strongest conflict of interest arose when Preussag sold its plant construction and 
shipbuilding operations to Babcock Borsig AG. This time the conflict was resolved in 
Preussag’s favor. WestLB was the largest shareholder of Babcock with only a 10% stake, 
and Neuber chaired its supervisory board as he did Preussag’s. In addition, Preussag 
management board member Klaus Linnebach, responsible for plant construction and 
shipbuilding, was a member of Babcock’s supervisory board, effectively putting the same 
                                                          
44  Der Spiegel, January 1, 1998, pp. 24-25. 
45  See Handelsblatt, February 5, 1998, p. 13. 
46  See Handelsblatt, May 15, 1998 p. 15 and Tagesspiegel, April 6, 1999 p. 21. 
 29
individuals on both sides of the negotiation table, and presenting Preussag with an excellent 
opportunity to divest itself of its loss-making plant construction and shipbuilding arm. 
Minority shareholders of Babcock protested in vain, arguing that the transaction did not fit 
Babcock’s strategy to focus on power plants.47 When the details of the transaction where 
disclosed on March 15, 1999, Preussag gained 7.2% and Babcock’s share lost 5% over the 
(0, 1) window, although we need to take into account simultaneous disclosures of financial 
statements and planned issues of new securities (see also Table 3). Hence, this transaction 
supports our general conclusion that sell-offs generated value for Preussag, but this time it 
took the form of a redistribution at the expense of Babcock shareholders. Babcock filed for 
bankruptcy on July 5, 2002 and the state persecution service (equivalent to the district 
attorney in the US) took up investigations against Neuber, Frenzel and others because of 
alleged violations of German securities laws in this context.48 
All of these cases are evidence for poor corporate governance, and they certainly resulted in 
poor decisions. However, none of them can account for the massive value destruction at 
Preussag and the particular strategy followed by Preussag’s management. Conflicts of 
interest were blatant and may have caused a loss of value in some cases (Preussag steel, 
Hapag Lloyd), but in other instances (notably Babcock) they benefited Preussag. 
6 Reaction by Preussag’s management 
We did not receive any support from Preussag in writing this study. We therefore rely 
exclusively on publicly available information. In April 2005, “Capital,” a German business 
magazine, picked up our story and confronted Preussag’s CEO Michael Frenzel during an 
interview with some of the results from a previous version of this paper (Capital, April 28, 
2005, pp. 54-55). Frenzel’s arguments are revealing. He argued that our calculation 
according to which Preussag destroyed several billions (see Section 4.4) is “unfair, because 
it ignores completely that the TUI management succeeded in building Europe’s largest 
tourism company,” thereby reemphasizing his focus on size.49 
Next, Frenzel argued that the TUI-management had “created high-quality tourism jobs in 
Germany” and suggested that the liquidation of Preussag would have destroyed 50,000 
jobs. This argument not only defies economic logic (the jobs in tourism companies would 
exist quite independently of whether Preussag acquired these companies or not) but also 
neglects that tourism employment at Preussag fell by more than 10% between 2002 and 
2004. 
                                                          
47  Handelsblatt, March 19, 1999, p. 14. 
48  Handelsblatt, January 14, 2003, p. 1. 
49  All translations from the German interview are ours. 
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Frenzel also expressed the view that Preussag’s stock was underpriced and did not reflect 
the company’s true earning potential. When the interviewer confronted him with the result 
that the future profitability of Preussag was not priced into its stock, but seemed to be well 
anticipated in increased managerial salaries, he retorted that compensation was about 
average for a DAX-30-corporation. This is correct, and restates why size is important from 
the point of view of management, as we suspected. Still, the argument does not recognize 
that Preussag was among the smallest companies in the index and almost dropped from the 
index when its value declined in 2004. 
Last, the interviewer asked Frenzel why Preussag’s management would not invest in their 
own stock if they considered it to be underpriced (they held 784 shares at the end of 2004). 
The response was that “buying [shares] is not the problem. The difficulties begin, when 
managers sell shares. Then there is an automatic presumption of insider trading based on 
the assumption that managers have additional information.” Hence, managers did not want 
to buy shares because they would not be able to sell them again. Clearly, the notion of 
holding shares for the long term was not considered. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we analyze the history of Preussag, later renamed TUI, over the decade from 
1994 to 2004, where they rebuilt an originally diversified industrial conglomerate into 
Europe’s largest tourism company. We collect data on 125 announcements relating to 93 
transactions and 292 news events during this period and analyze the sometimes puzzling 
history of Preussag’s stock. We categorize events in order to disentangle the value impact 
of different parts of Preussag’s strategy and test competing hypotheses for the sources of 
value creation and value destruction. 
We find that Preussag benefited from its divestitures, whereas its engagement in tourism 
destroyed value. The underperformance of its stock is a direct consequence of its business 
strategy and cannot be attributed to exogenous shocks like the events of September 11, 
2001. In the tourism industry size seems to matter little for profitability as economies of 
scale and gains from market power are limited. We conclude that Preussag’s management 
sought size for its own benefit. Our analysis of corporate governance at Preussag yielded 
three insights that are likely to have contributed to Preussag’s underperformance: 
• Management compensation increased by more than 200% over the decade 
considered in this study. At the same time, compensation was practically unrelated 
to firm performance. 
• Personal networks generated private benefits through additional board seats and 
created a governance structure where accountability was easily lost. 
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• The agency problem within the largest shareholder made it not only a poor monitor 
but in all likelihood even a motor of the tourism strategy. Hence, the largest 
shareholder helped creating benefits from control rather than constraining them. 
Curiously, none of the watchdogs felt particularly alarmed by the ongoing destruction of 
shareholder value. Preussag’s stock outperformed the market during the period when they 
entered tourism, and analysts and the press misread this as a good signal about its decision 
to focus on tourism. Here our analysis becomes valuable as it shows that aggregate 
performance is misleading. We disentangle the impact of divestitures from the investments 
in tourism and show that the former created the value that camouflaged the losses from the 
latter. We are therefore skeptical about the role of independent analysts, some of whom did 
not only fail to inform the market but also failed to understand market signals as investors 
started to abandon the stock. 
The misguided management policies at Preussag bring out an important point of the “free 
cash flow” theory: The problem is not just high operating cash flows, but managerial 
discretion over large amounts of liquid resources, independently of their source.50 At 
Preussag, divestitures created additional liquidity – and they appear to have only been 
undertaken to provide this liquidity! – without any corresponding incentives for 
management to use this liquidity efficiently or any check against management’s pet project 
to be the dominant tourism company in Europe. 
                                                          
50  The free cash flow theory goes back to Jensen (1986), (1993). DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Wruck (2002) 
make a point related to ours in their analysis of managerial discretion created by liquid working capital at 
L. A. Gear. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) show that the stock market discounts companies who retain 
the proceeds from asset sales. Allen and McConnell (1998) make a similar point on equity carve-outs. 
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Table 1: Preussag’s sales by business units 
This table displays the sales of Preussag’s business units, including sales between units. In 2001, Preussag changed its end of fiscal year from September 30 to December 31. 
The table does not report sales for the shortened fiscal year that consisted only of the last quarter of 2000. The Herfindahl index reflects the degree of diversification of the 
conglomerate. It is equal to the sum over all divisions of their squared percentages of sales. All numbers before conversion to the euro in 1999 are reported in euros using the 
official conversion rate of 1.95583 DM/€. 
 
Panel 1A: Preussag’s sales from 1992/93 to 1997/98 
  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95   1995/96  1996/97 1997/98 
  Mill. € %  Mill. € %  Mill. € %   Mill. € %  Mill. € % Mill. € %
Tourism - - - - - -  - - - - 5,530 27.9%
Steel production 1,409 10.4% 1,683 12.4% 1,876 12.4%  1,615 11.2% 1,787 11.5% - -
Non-ferrous metal production 652 4.8% 612 4.5% 691 4.6%  723 5.0% 370 2.4% - -
Oil and gas production 524 3.9% 501 3.7% 520 3.4%  577 4.0% 702 4.5% 905 4.6%
Mining activities 953 7.0% 718 5.3% 742 4.9%  678 4.7% 556 3.6% 607 3.1%
Trading 4,986 36.9% 5,613 41.4% 6,574 43.4%  5,571 38.5% 6,145 39.5% 5,081 25.7%
Logistics 479 3.5% 479 3.5% 954 6.3%  1,025 7.1% 1,060 6.8% 3,242 16.4%
Shipbuilding 822 6.1% 688 5.1% 576 3.8%  911 6.3% 610 3.9% 572 2.9%
Railcar manufacturing 220 1.6% - - - - - - - - - -
Plant construction 1,512 11.2% 1,475 10.9% 1,706 11.3% 1,675 11.6% 2,121 13.6% 1,663 8.4%
Information technology 591 4.4% 310 2.3% - - - - - - - -
Building engineering 950 7.0% 1,036 7.6% 1,137 7.5% 1,321 9.1% 1,840 11.8% 1,909 9.6%
Components 178 1.3% 171 1.3% 104 0.7% 93 0.6% 89 0.6% - -
Other/Consolidation 242 1.8% 257 1.9% 253 1.7% 294 2.0% 289 1.9% 282 1.4%
Total 13,518 100.0%  13,543 100.0%  15,133 100.0%  14,483 100.0%  15,569 100.0%  19,791 100.0%
Earnings before Taxes 177 1.3% 258 1.9% 317 2.1% 239 1.7% 360 2.3% 521 2.6%
Herfindahl index 18.1%   21.6%   23.4%  19.8%   21.2%   19.1%
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Panel 1B: Preussag’s sales from 1998/99 to 2004 
  1998/99  1999/2000  2001   2002  2003  2004 
  Mill. € %  Mill. € %  Mill. € %   Mill. € %  Mill. € %  Mill. € %
Tourism 8,480 45.5% 12,768 50.8% 12,782 57.0%  12,432 61.2% 12,701 66.1% 13,204 73.2%
Steel production - - - - - -  - - - - - -
Non-ferrous metal production - - - - - -  - - - - - -
Oil and gas production 765 4.1% 983 3.9% 836 3.7%  448 2.2% 177 0.9% - -
Mining activities - - - - - -  - - - - - -
Trading 3,818 20.5% 4,800 19.1% 3,144 14.0%  3,150 15.5% 2,056 10.7% 972 5.4%
Logistics 3,332 17.9% 3,972 15.8% 3,891 17.4%  3,778 18.6% 3,915 20.4% 3,972 19.2%
Shipbuilding - - - - - -  - - - - - -
Railcar manufacturing - - - - - -  - - - - - -
Plant construction - - - - - -  - - - - - -
Information technology - - - - - -  - - - - - -
Building engineering 1,999 10.7% 2,372 9.4% 1,611 7.2%  203 1.0% - - - -
Components - - - - - -  - - - - - -
Other/Consolidation 243 1.3% 217 0.9% 147 0.7%  292 1.4% 366 1.9% 398 2.2%
Total 18,637 100.0% 25,112 100.0% 22,411 100.0%  20,303 100.0% 19,215 100.0% 18,046 100.0%
Earnings before Taxes 620 3.3% 747 3.0% 811 3.6% 608 3.0% 913 4.8% 622 3.4%
Herfindahl index 29.4%  33.1%  38.2%  43.4%  49.0%  57.6%
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Table 2: Preussag’s abnormal returns in Phase 1:  
Consolidate core businesses (1994-1997) 
This table presents the results of eight regressions of Preussag’s daily abnormal log returns over phase 1 
from January 1, 1994 to June 10, 1997 on an intercept and three dummy variables: acquisitions, sell-offs, 
and news. The dummy variables are set equal to one on every day of the event windows around the events 
they indicate. The table reports the estimated regression coefficients multiplied by the number of days the 
respective dummy variable is equal to one. Unexplained return is the estimated intercept multiplied by 
the number of observations in the regression. °, *, **, *** marks significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 
1% significance level, respectively. Results are displayed for four different event windows (-x, y) from x 
days before to y days after the event.  Panel A presents regression results for abnormal returns calculated 
relative to the Frankfurt market portfolio CDAX. Panel B contains similar results when abnormal returns 
are calculated relative to our weighted industry benchmark. 
Panel A: Abnormal returns relative to the market index (CDAX) 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Acquisitions 12 0.13% -1.58% -2.72% -4.58% 
Sell-offs 15 3.97% -0.15% 6.92% 2.62% 
News 67 -24.35%** -25.99%* -35.62%** -43.36%*** 
Unexplained returns N/A 3.13%  10.60% 14.30%  28.21%  
Total return N/A -17.11%  -17.11% -17.11%  -17.11%  
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns relative to weighted industry benchmark 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Acquisitions 12 -1.82% -1.59% -5.73% -5.72% 
Sell-offs 15 11.53%* 0.26% 10.79% -0.81% 
News 67 -21.76%° -26.87%° -30.78%* -40.09%** 
Unexplained returns N/A -10.71% 5.44% 2.96% 23.86%  
Total return N/A -22.76% -22.76% -22.76% -22.76%  
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Table 3: Individual cumulative abnormal returns in Phase 2: Enter Tourism (1997-2001) 
This table displays the cumulative abnormal log returns over four different event windows (-x, y) from x days before to y days after the event. 
Cumulated Abnormal Returns Date of 
Ann. Description of event (0,1) (-1,1) (0,2) (-1,2) 
11 Jun 97 Preussag announces the plan to acquire the tourism and logistics company Hapag-Lloyd. Sales: €2.3bn. 3.1%  2.4%  2.7%  2.0%  
02 Sep 97 Preussag announces the agreement with Hapag-Lloyd shareholders to acquire 99.2% of all shares for €1.43bn. -4.7%** -6.4%** -6.4%** -8.1%***
12 Jan 98 Preussag sells 51% and an option for the remaining 48.8% of its steel production unit (Preussag Stahl AG) to the state of Lower Saxony and NordLB. Price: €542m  6.2%*** 6.0%** 4.5%* 4.2%  
02 Mar 98 
German federal cartel office allows Preussag to acquire Hapag-Lloyd and the majority of 
TUI. At the same time Schickedanz-Group announces to sell its 20% stake of TUI. After 
WestLB and Deutsche Bahn exercise their pre-emptive rights to purchase 7.5% 
respectively 5% of TUI shares, Preussag acquires the remaining 7.5%. Price: €96m 
3.6%° 3.3% 4.3%° 4.1% 
09 Jun 98 Preussag announces the acquisition of 12.6% of TUI from WestLB. Preussag becomes majority shareholder of TUI. Price: €160m 3.0%  1.8%  3.0%  1.9%  
02 Jul 98 Preussag reorganizes its tourism activities in a new holding (Hapag Touristik Union). Sales: €5.3bn 1.0% 0.2% 4.4%* 3.6% 
06 Jul 98 Reorganization of Preussag's management board. The division managers lose power. This is an important step for the coming divestitures of Preussag. 9.1%*** 10.6%*** 13.3%*** 14.8%***
06 Oct 98 WestLB and Carlson agree on a merger of Thomas Cook and the UK business of Carlson; Carlson will hold 22% and WestLB 78% of the merged company. -6.3%** -4.3% -3.5% -1.6% 
08 Oct 98 Rumors about further transactions between Preussag and WestLB. Preussag confirms talks with WestLB about an acquisition or cooperation with Thomas Cook. 6.7%*** 4.6%* 9.0%*** 7.0%** 
12 Nov 98 
After an intervention of Germany's federal cartel office WestLB has to sell its stake in 
LTU. Until the end of 2000, WestLB formally keeps 10.2% of LTU because of 
international aviation laws. 
0.3% 1.2% -1.6% -0.7% 
02 Dec 98 Rumors that Preussag plans to acquire Thomas Cook and negotiates with WestLB about WestLB's stake in Thomas Cook. 0.5%  5.4%** 3.6%  8.6%***
17 Dec 98 Preussag acquires 100% of First travel agencies (22% from WestLB). Sales: 1.8bn. 3.3%° 4.8%* 3.5%  5.0%° 
23 Dec 98 Preussag acquires 24.9% and an option for further 25.2% of Thomas Cook from WestLB for €146m. 0.5% -1.8% -0.5% -2.8% 
end of 1998 Niedersachsen Holding GmbH is dissolved. Its Preussag shares are distributed among the three owners of Niedersachsen Holding. (No exact date available.)                 
 38
 
Cumulated Abnormal Returns Date of 
Ann. Description of event (0,1) (-1,1) (0,2) (-1,2) 
05 Jan 99 Preussag sells its complete share of 50.2% of Deilmann-Haniel GmbH (mining and engineering firm) to the Heitkamp-Group. Sales: €373m  1.6% 7.4%*** -1.3% 4.5%° 
02 Feb 99 
Preussag announces talks about its plant construction and shipbuilding units with Babcock 
(a German plant construction company). Sales: €2.1bn. At the same day: publication of 
Preussag's annual accounts and announcement of an equity rights issue.  
-4.6%** 1.0%  -6.8%** -1.2%  
08 Feb 99 Babcock's supervisory board agrees to the acquisition of Preussag's plant construction and shipbuilding business. 4.0%* 7.0%*** -0.8% 2.3% 
15 Mar 99 Preussag and Babcock close the deal. Preussag receives €180m in stock and €142m in cash for 100% of its plant construction and 50% of its shipbuilding unit. 7.2%*** 4.4%° 4.3%° 1.5%  
06 Apr 99 Preussag's acquires 25% of TUI from Deutsche Bahn (German railway operator). Price: €320m. 1.5%  0.0%  4.7%° 3.2%  
17 Jun 99 
Preussag and Kuoni (largest Swiss tourism company) announce a cooperation of their 
tourism activities in Switzerland. Kuoni gets the option to acquire up to 49% of TUI 
Suisse. Sales of TUI Suisse: €343m 
2.1% 2.2% 8.1%*** 8.3%***
01 Jul 99 Preussag acquires the remaining 24.9% of TUI from WestLB.  -2.3%  -2.6%  2.3%  2.1%  
30 Sep 99 Preussag exercises its option to acquire another 25.2% of Thomas Cook from WestLB. -3.9%° -6.3%* -2.5% -4.8% 
04 Feb 00 Preussag announces to acquire 75% of Goulet Touropa (Austria's largest tourism company). Sales: €330m -1.2%  -1.3%  -7.6%*** -7.6%***
12 May 00 
Rumors about a new bidder, most probably Preussag, in the takeover battle between C&N 
(3rd largest European tourism group) and Thomson Travel Group plc (4th largest 
European tourism company). 
-9.1%*** -10.5%*** -15.8%*** -17.3%***
15 May 00 
Preussag announces the friendly takeover of the Thomson Travel Group plc. Price: €2.8bn. 
At the same day: publication of Preussag's interim semi-annual accounts, which were in 
line with market expectations. 
-11.9%*** -15.8%*** -9.9%*** -13.9%***
13 Jul 00 Profit warning from Airtours (3rd largest European tourism company). -7.9%*** -8.5%*** -10.0%*** -10.7%***
01 Aug 00 Preussag announces the plan to sell all 21,000 apartments of its real estate activities. Price: ca. €500m 6.4%*** 9.4%*** 9.9%*** 12.9%***
09 Oct 00 Preussag announces the stepwise acquisition of Nouvelles Frontières (largest French tourism company). Price for the complete acquisition: €123m 4.6%** 4.4%° 3.0% 2.8% 
05 Dec 00 
Preussag sells its share (50.1%) of Thomas Cook to C&N Touristic to avoid an 
intervention of European competition authorities against the Thomson Travel takeover. 
Price: €450m 
5.0%** 7.0%** 4.9%* 6.8%** 
04 Apr 01 Preussag acquires the remaining 50% of its Belgian tourism subsidiary TUI Belgium. -3.7%* -3.6%  -5.2%** -5.1%* 
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Table 4: Preussag’s abnormal returns in Phase 2:  
Enter Tourism (1997-2001) 
This table presents the results of eight regressions of Preussag’s daily abnormal log returns over phase 
2 from June 11, 1997 to September 10, 2001 on an intercept and six dummy variables: tourism 
acquisitions from WestLB, other tourism acquisitions, other (non-tourism) acquisitions, sell-offs, 
tourism news, and other news. The dummy variables are set equal to one on every day of the event 
windows around the events they indicate. The table reports the estimated regression coefficients 
multiplied by the number of days the respective dummy variable is equal to one. Unexplained return is 
the estimated intercept multiplied by the number of observations in the regression. °, *, **, *** marks 
significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. Results are displayed for 
four different event windows (-x, y) from x days before to y days after the event. Panel A presents 
regression results for abnormal returns calculated relative to the Frankfurt market portfolio CDAX. 
Panel B contains similar results when abnormal returns are calculated relative to our weighted industry 
benchmark. 
Panel A: Abnormal returns relative to the market index (CDAX) 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Tourism acquisitions          
 from WestLB 6 10.37%° 9.20% 16.27%* 15.05%° 
 other 23 -22.59%° -37.37%** -34.92%** -52.41%*** 
Other acquisitions 10 13.44%° 10.00% 13.01% 10.00% 
Sell-offs 25 44.69%*** 52.17%*** 26.87%° 37.47%* 
Tourism news 8 8.00% 20.18%** 4.24% 16.59% 
Other news 80 16.21% 42.58% 18.09% 43.85% 
Unexplained returns N/A -47.99% -74.63% -21.43% -48.42% 
Total return N/A 22.13% 22.13% 22.13% 22.13% 
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns relative to weighted industry benchmark 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Tourism acquisitions          
 from WestLB 6 8.81% 9.19% 15.79%* 16.13%* 
 other 23 -17.29% -37.83%** -24.49%° -47.53%** 
Other acquisitions 10 15.98%* 16.90%° 11.74% 12.90% 
Sell-offs 25 37.88%*** 48.31%*** 14.41% 27.44% 
Tourism news 8 2.74% 8.42% 0.71% 6.57% 
Other news 80 34.08% 49.32%° 36.08% 52.25%° 
Unexplained returns N/A -58.13% -70.26% -30.16% -43.68% 
Total return N/A 24.07% 24.07% 24.07% 24.07% 
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Table 5: Event study approach for Phase 2: 
Enter Tourism (1997-2001) 
This table displays cumulative abnormal log returns (CARs) over the event windows of several groups 
of events over phase 2 from June 11, 1997 to September 10, 2001. The ‘number of events’ is the 
number of days on which events of the respective event group took place. Note that this number can be 
lower than the corresponding number in Table 4, because days on which more than one event (from 
different event groups) took place are classified as ‘Multiple events’ here. Around these days, event 
windows are fitted, and abnormal returns are cumulated across these windows. °, *, **, *** marks 
significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. Results are displayed for 
four different event windows (-x, y) from x days before to y days after the event. Panel A presents 
regression results for abnormal returns calculated relative to the Frankfurt market portfolio CDAX. 
Panel B contains similar results when abnormal returns are calculated relative to our weighted industry 
benchmark. The table also shows a breakdown of the CARs of tourism acquisitions into the CARs of 
tourism acquisitions from WestLB and the CARs of other tourism acquisitions. 
Panel A: Abnormal returns relative to the market index (CDAX) 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Tourism acquisitions 27 -12.61% -34.51%** -10.32% -25.15%° 
 from WestLB 6 9.92%° 6.59% 12.97%* 9.64% 
 other 21 -22.53%** -41.10%*** -23.29%* -34.79%** 
Other acquisitions 9 14.02%* 6.05% 16.75%* 7.80% 
Sell-offs 20 40.52%*** 47.67%*** 21.51%° 34.48%** 
Tourism news 8 5.04% 23.14%*** 13.24%* 23.78%*** 
Other news 68 13.43% 17.10% 23.67% 25.46% 
Multiple Events 6 8.38% 16.07%° -8.12% 1.97% 
Days without events 939 -46.65% -53.40% -34.60% -46.21% 
Sum 1077 22.13% 22.13% 22.13% 22.13% 
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns relative to weighted industry benchmark 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Tourism acquisitions 27 -12.51% -34.37%** -12.62% -23.66%° 
 from WestLB 6 8.47% 6.96% 11.19%* 9.67% 
 other 21 -20.98%* -41.32%*** -23.81%* -33.33%** 
Other acquisitions 9 14.64%** 11.76% 14.01%* 11.84% 
Sell-offs 20 35.41%*** 45.29%*** 12.94% 29.74%** 
Tourism news 8 -0.16% 10.66% 6.77% 10.54% 
Other news 68 24.41% 22.76% 25.21% 27.07% 
Multiple Events 6 13.30%* 16.77%° 6.10% 6.94% 
Days without events 939 -51.03% -48.80% -28.34% -38.41% 
Sum 1077 24.07% 24.07% 24.07% 24.07% 
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Table 6: Preussag’s abnormal returns in Phase 3:  
Consolidate Tourism (2001-2004) 
This table presents the results of eight regressions of Preussag’s daily abnormal log returns over phase 
3 from September 11, 2001 to December 31, 2004 on an intercept and five dummy variables: tourism 
acquisitions, other acquisitions, sell-offs, tourism news, and other news. The dummy variables are set 
equal to one on every day of the event windows around the events they indicate. The table reports the 
estimated regression coefficients multiplied by the number of days the respective dummy variable is 
equal to one. Unexplained return is the estimated intercept multiplied by the number of observations in 
the regression. °, *, **, *** marks significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. Results are displayed for four different event windows (-x, y) from x days before to y days 
after the event. Panel A presents regression results for abnormal returns calculated relative to the 
Frankfurt market portfolio CDAX. Panel B contains similar results when abnormal returns are 
calculated relative to our weighted industry benchmark. 
Panel A: Abnormal returns relative to the market index (CDAX) 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Tourism acquisitions 11 5.07% 1.69% 10.32% 6.81% 
Other acquisitions 1 1.89% 3.61% 1.21% 3.07% 
Sell-offs 22 -4.53% -14.92% -13.79% -24.12% 
Tourism news 36 -20.45% -16.92% -16.38% -9.36% 
Other news 101 22.88% 55.36% 30.24% 82.95%°
Unexplained returns N/A -54.71% -78.66% -61.44% -109.18% 
Total return N/A -49.84% -49.84% -49.84%  -49.84% 
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns relative to weighted industry benchmark 
Event window Event group Number of events (0, 1) (-1, 1) (0, 2) (-1, 2) 
Tourism acquisitions 11 -3.29% -5.67% -1.02% -3.47% 
Other acquisitions 1 2.23% 1.94% 3.08% 2.87% 
Sell-offs 22 -13.28% -29.12%° -15.59% -31.96%°
Tourism news 36 -12.30% -7.21% -1.10% 3.68% 
Other news 101 36.00% 56.54% 38.91% 71.10% 
Unexplained returns N/A -89.96% -97.09% -104.88% -122.82% 
Total return N/A -80.60% -80.60% -80.60%  -80.60% 
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Table 7: Return of a hypothetical liquidation of Preussag 
This table displays the evolvement and the (actual) returns of two hypothetical liquidation strategies of 
Preussag AG. The hypothetical strategy starts on September 30, 1997. From then on, all free cash flows 
including all proceeds from sell-offs are assumed to be paid out to shareholders and invested either in 
the tourism and transportation index or in the market index (CDAX). Index returns are actual returns 
and not log returns. No new acquisitions are made, and the existing debt is repaid on September 30, 
1997. For each date, the value of the investment in the index of all cash flows that have previously been 
paid out is shown in the column ‘value’. For a few smaller sell-offs, we could not obtain the proceeds, 
so we set the cash inflow equal to zero. For the remaining subsidiaries on December 31, 2004 we use 
prices obtained after December 31, 2004 or balance sheet data. 
Investment in 
Tourism and 
Transport   
Investment in 
market index Date Description of inflow Inflow
Index 
return Value   
Index 
return Value 
09/30/97 Liquid assets (1,093) minus debt (852) at the end of fiscal year 1996/97 241.0         241.0     241.0 
01/12/98 Preussag sells steel business 542.0 0.38%       783.9 -2.73%    776.4 
04/20/98 Preussag sells its uranium business (share 50%) 153.0 24.64%    1,130.0 30.34%  1,165.0 
06/02/98 Preussag sells a company from its components business 0.0 2.60%    1,159.5 2.31%  1,191.9 
09/30/98 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 116.9 -27.99%       951.8 -19.06%  1,081.7 
10/20/98 Preussag sells its recycling unit 0.0 3.76%       987.6 1.84%  1,101.6 
11/11/98 Preussag sells part of its plant construction business 0.0 2.38%    1,011.1 3.37%  1,138.8 
01/01/99 Preussag sells its coal mine 82.0 7.56%    1,169.6 5.05%  1,278.3 
01/05/99 Preussag sells the mining and engineering company Deilmann-Haniel (share: 50.2%) 29.0 0.35%    1,202.7 4.19%  1,360.8 
03/15/99 Preussag sells 100% of its plant construction unit and 50% of the shipbuilding unit 322.0 14.85%    1,703.3 -3.22%  1,638.9 
09/08/99 Preussag sells 4.6% of Metaleurop S.A. 10.0 1.23%    1,734.3 6.55%  1,756.3 
09/30/99 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 233.5 -5.01%    1,880.8 -4.66%  1,908.0 
03/27/00 Preussag sells 8.6% of Metaleurop S.A. 20.0 7.61%    2,044.1 49.36%  2,869.8 
09/30/00 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 494.1 -5.67%    2,422.3 -14.55%  2,946.4 
10/05/00 Preussag sells part of its trading business 58.0 1.11%    2,507.3 0.60%  3,022.0 
12/31/00 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 139.4 -2.82%    2,575.9 -11.58%  2,811.4 
12/31/00 Preussag sells 6800 apartments 162.0 0.00%   2,737.9 0.00%  2,973.4 
03/30/01 Preussag sells the fire protection firm Minimax 276.0 -4.65%    2,886.5 -7.16%  3,036.6 
03/30/01 Preussag sells 400 apartments 10.0 0.00%    2,896.5 0.00%  3,046.6 
04/26/01 Preussag sells the sanitary equipment producer Kermi Group 140.0 1.73%    3,086.7 4.28%  3,317.0 
06/22/01 Preussag sells its construction materials unit Fels Group 750.0 1.75%    3,890.6 -1.72%  4,010.1 
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Investment in 
Tourism and 
Transport   
Investment in 
market index Date Description of inflow Inflow
Index 
return Value   
Index 
return Value 
07/06/01 Preussag sells most of its heating technology business 300.0 0.38%    4,205.3 -2.00%  4,229.9 
07/16/01 Preussag sells part of its oil and gas exploration and its stake in Ruhrgas AG 350.0 -1.07%    4,510.4 -0.28%  4,568.1 
08/23/01 Preussag sells the storage specialist KBB 21.0 -2.90%    4,400.6 -8.24%  4,212.7 
08/31/01 Preussag sells its oil drilling business (Deutag Group) 210.0 -1.11%    4,562.0 -1.32%  4,367.2 
12/31/01 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 402.2 -6.94%    4,647.5 -0.30%  4,756.5 
03/11/02 Preussag sells the remaining 50% of its shipbuilding unit (HDW AG) 400.0 10.14%    5,518.8 3.61%  5,328.1 
06/06/02 Preussag sells part of its components business 0.0 -5.28%    5,227.6 -10.07%  4,791.4 
07/01/02 Preussag sells its software subsidiary 0.0 -3.40%    5,049.8 -5.16%  4,544.4 
12/06/02 Preussag sells its electric-chemical business (share: 50%) 0.0 -11.33%   4,477.8 -25.34%  3,392.9 
12/19/02 Preussag sells 14000 apartments 260.0 -3.42%    4,584.5 -7.34%  3,403.7 
12/27/02 Preussag sells its domestic oil business 1000.0 -2.39%    5,474.8 -3.70%  4,277.7 
12/31/02 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 190.3 0.66%    5,701.1 1.76%  4,543.2 
01/22/03 Preussag sells its foreign oil business 300.0 -5.13%    5,708.8 -2.58%  4,726.0 
09/11/03 Preussag sells a large part of its trading business 200.0 28.76%    7,550.9 27.78%   6,238.9 
09/19/03 Preussag sells its 24% stake in a power plant 0.0 2.84%    7,765.4 0.52%  6,271.3 
12/31/03 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 38.9 3.22%    8,054.4 9.95%  6,934.0 
03/31/04 Lehnkering AG (100%) 250.0 7.12%    8,877.8  -1.32%    7,092.7 
07/19/04 Algeco S.A. market capitalization (67%) 320.0 4.01%    9,553.4  -0.83%    7,353.5 
12/31/04 Operating cash flow without tourism and logistics 129.1 7.98%  10,445.2   10.84%    8,279.6 
12/31/04 VTG AG (100%) 400.0 0.00%  10,845.2  0.00%    8,679.6 
12/31/04 Metal trading unit (PNA Group) 414.4 0.00%  11,259.6  0.00%    9,094.0 
12/31/04 Wolf GmbH (80%) 16.0 0.00%  11,275.6 0.00%    9,110.0 
12/31/04 Preussag Immobilien GmbH (100%) 96.4 0.00%  11,372.1  0.00%    9,206.4 
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Table 8: Management compensation at Preussag 
This table displays the average number of officers on Preussag’s management board and their total and 
their average compensation for each fiscal year. In 2001, Preussag changed its end of fiscal year from 
September 30 to December 31. The table does not report the compensation for the shortened fiscal year 
that consisted only of the last quarter of 2000. 
Compensation (€ ‘000)Fiscal 
year 
Average number 
of officers Total Average 
1993/94 8.25 4,337 526 
1994/95 8.00 5,157 645 
1995/96 8.00 5,227 653 
1996/97 8.00 5,024 628 
1997/98 6.50 5,232 805 
1998/99 4.00 5,163 1,291 
1999/00 4.00 6,323 1,581 
2001 6.00 8,165 1,361 
2002 6.00 10,222 1,704 
2003 5.17 9,342 1,808 
2004 4.00 7,969 1,992 
 
Table 9: Voting rights at Preussag’s AGM controlled by WestLB 
This table displays the percentage of Preussag’s equity capital that was represented at Preussag’s 
Annual General Meetings (AGM) from 1995 to 2004. It also shows the proportion of these voting 
rights that were controlled by WestLB alone or by WestLB and Niedersachsen Holding (NH). WestLB 
held a 33.3% stake in Niedersachsen Holding (see Figure 1A). Niedersachsen Holding was dissolved 
by the end of 1998. 
   Voting rights at the AGM held by 
Date of AGM   
Capital 
represented at 
AGM  WestLB 
WestLB 
and NH 
24. Mar. 1994  N/A N/A N/A 
30. Mar. 1995  70.3% 41.4% 56.2% 
21. Mar. 1996  74.0% 39.3% 53.4% 
26. Mar. 1997  66.5% 43.8% 59.4% 
26. Mar. 1998  65.5% 44.5% 60.3% 
31. Mar. 1999  67.0% 49.3%  
12. Apr. 2000  39.0% 84.6%  
18. May 2001  37.2% 88.8%  
26. Jun. 2002  42.2% 78.2%  
18. Jun. 2003  54.0% 61.1%  
18. Mai. 2004  54.3% 60.8%  
Average:   57.0%  59.2%   
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Figure 1: Description of the WestLB/Preussag network 
The following figures show the cross-holdings and interlocking directorates in the WestLB/Preussag 
network at three points in time during the period 1994 to 2004. The percentages next to the arrows provide 
the voting rights of the firm at the start of the arrow in the firm at the tip of the arrow. The figures also list 
selected members of the executive and the supervisory boards. MM stands for ‘member of the management 
board’, CS for ‘chairman of the supervisory board’, and MS for ‘member of the supervisory board.’* 
Figure 1A: January 1994 until June 1997 
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* According to Handelsblatt from June 5, 1992, WestLB holds 34.3% of LTU’s cash-flow rights but has the 
majority of the voting rights. 
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Figure 1B: December 1999 
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Figure 1C: December 2004 
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Figure 2: Preussag’s stock price history 
The three figures show Preussag’s performance index (‘Preussag’) and the German stock market’s 
performance index (‘CDAX’) over the decade from January 1994 to December 2004. Both series are 
normalized to 100 on January 1, 1994, June 11, 1997, and September 11, 2001. 
Figure 2A: Preussag’s stock price from January 1, 1994 to June 10, 1997 
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Figure 2B: Preussag’s stock price from June 11, 1997 to September 10, 2001 
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Figure 2C: Preussag’s stock price from September 11, 2001 to December 31, 2004 
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Figure 3: Correlations of Preussag’s stock with the market and with 
industry portfolios 
Figure 3a shows the regression coefficient of a regression of Preussag’s daily stock returns on the daily 
CDAX returns and an intercept over a 500 trading day moving window (-250 to +250 days). The intercept 
is not displayed in the figures. Figure 3b shows the results of a similar regression on the returns of the 
tourism and transport index and the steel and engineering index. 
Figure 3A: Regression coefficient of Preussag’s returns on the market return 
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Figure 3B: Regression coefficients of Preussag’s returns on the returns of two 
industry portfolios 
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Figure 4: Preussag’s supervisory board and board overlaps 
This figures displays the firms, organizations and individuals that were represented in Preussag’s 
supervisory board between 1994 and 2004. Three of these firms had themselves a WestLB representative 
on their supervisory board. Details on the individual interlocks are provided in the footnotes. MM stands 
for ‘member of the management board’, CS for ‘chairman of the supervisory board’, and MS for ‘member 
of the supervisory board.’ 
 
(1) Friedel Neuber: CEO of WestLB (until 2001), CS of Preussag (died 10/23/2004), followed by Norbert 
Emmerich (11/5/2004 - 1/26/2005); new chairman Jürgen Krumnow (since 11/10/2004). 
(2) Hans Henning Offen: MM of WestLB (until 2002); Since Mr. Offen left Preussag's supervisory board 
(6/18/2003), WestLB was represented by Jürgen Sengera (6/18/2003 - 8/21/2003), followed by 
Johannes Ringel (9/8/2003 - 1/12/2004) and Thomas Fischer (CEO) (1/16/2004 - 1/26/2005).  
(3) Friedel Neuber: Chairman of RWE's supervisory board (died 10/23/2004), followed by Thomas 
Fischer; H.-H.Offen: Supervisory board memberships of a subsidiary of RWE. 
(4) Friedel Neuber: Member of Deutsche Bahn's supervisory board (died 10/23/2004). 
(5) Friedel Neuber: Chairman of ThyssenKrupp's supervisory board (died 10/23/2004); H.-H.Offen: 
Supervisory board memberships of a subsidiary of ThyssenKrupp. 
(6) Herbert Krämer: MM of RWE and MS of Preussag (until 1996). Dietmar Kuhnt: CEO of RWE and 
MS of Preussag (1996-2003). 
(7) Heinz Dürr: CEO of Deutsche Bahn (until 1997) and CS of Deutsche Bahn (1997-1999). 
(8) Ekkehard Schulz: CEO of ThyssenKrupp. 
(9) Günther Saßmannshausen: Former CEO of Preussag (until 1988). 
(10) Rolf-E. Breuer: CEO of Deutsche Bank and MS of Preussag (until 1997). Jürgen Krumnow: MM of 
Deutsche Bank (until 1999), Advisor of Deutsche Bank (since 2000) and MS of Preussag (since 
1997). Deutsche Bank sold their 10% stake in Hapag-Lloyd to Preussag in 1997. 
(11) Franz Vranitzky: Former Austrian Chancellor and member of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. 
(12) Bernd W. Voss: MM (until 2001) and MS (since 2002) of Dresdner Bank. Dresdner Bank sold their 
10% stake in Hapag-Lloyd to Preussag in 1997. 
(13) Klaus Liesen: CEO of Ruhrgas (until 1996) and CS of Ruhrgas (since 1996). 
(14) Hans Carl Deilmann: Owner and CEO of C.Deilmann AG, a company taken over by Preussag in 
several steps during the 1980s and early 1990s, MS of Preussag (until 1996). Jürgen Deilmann: CEO 
of Deilmann-Montan GmbH and MS Preussag (1997-2001). 
(15) Gerold Bezzenberger: MM of DSW, a German investor protection association, and MS of Preussag 
(until 2001). Jella S. Benner-Heinacher: CEO of DSW and MS of Preussag (2001-2004). 
(16) Manfred Schneider: CS of Bayer. 
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